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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey reviews major tort cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Florida and Florida District Courts of Appeal that cover substantive tort is-
sues that were published between the time period of July 2005 until July
2008. It will also cover some federal cases that address Florida substantive
tort law issues. In addition, section XIII deals with tortious conduct that oc-
curs on cruise ships. Although these cases are primarily controlled by admi-
ralty law, the cruise ship industry is a growing and important business in
Florida and elsewhere, and the liability of the cruise industry for injuries
occurring on cruise ships is becoming an area of concern to the increasing
number of persons taking cruises as well as governmental officials. The time
period begins where the last Tort Law Review Survey created for Nova Law
Review ended. It will thus discuss cases that interpret the provisions of sta-
tutes and defenses that deal with elements that constitute the definitions of
the same. It will focus on cases that address provisions or issues for the first
time, clarify areas that have created confusion, or change existing under-
1. See generally William E. Adams, Jr., Tort Law: 2003-05 Review of Florida Law, 30
NOVA L. REV. 75 (2005) [hereinafter Tort Law II].
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standings. Therefore, this article will follow the conventions followed in
selecting cases for discussion utilized in prior Tort Law Survey articles.2
II. DUTY
The dispute over what creates a duty is a legal question that frequently
arises in Tort cases, and the past three years have been no different in Flori-
da's appellate courts. As can be seen, the question of who has a duty and its
extent has arisen in a range of contexts.3 As is the custom, a number of cases
have concerned duties to persons injured in automobile accidents.4 Cases
have arisen concerning the obligations of public utilities and schools.'
In Hewitt v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. 6 the First District Court of
Appeal addressed the duty owed to someone injured by a stolen vehicle, in
which the owner had not secured the keys.7 At this particular Avis car lot, at
least thirty-seven cars, between November 1999 and May 2000, were re-
moved by employees and "rented" or entrusted to other drivers.' "[B]y Feb-
ruary 2001, managerial employees . . . were aware that vehicles had been
missing from the lot.. . ."9 Despite this knowledge, Avis did not establish
safeguards to prevent theft or other wrongful removal and use of its cars.' °
The stolen car at issue in this case "was last seen in Avis's possession on
February 23, 2001, and Avis determined [that] it was missing [on] February
2. See, e.g., id. As in past articles, it does not address every single appellate opinion,
but instead focuses on cases that deal with substantive elements. See, e.g., id. Therefore, it
does not deal with cases primarily focused on evidentiary or procedural issues.
3. See generally Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977); Mi-
ami-Dade County v. Deerwood Homeowners' Ass'n, 979 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2008); Dent v. Dennis Pharmacy, Inc., 924 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Franco v.
Miami-Dade County, 947 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Fernandez v. Fla. Nat'l
Coll., Inc., 925 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Horton v. Freeman, 917 So. 2d
1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Almarante v. Art Inst. of Fort Lauderdale, Inc., 921 So.
2d 703 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Hewitt v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 912 So. 2d 682
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Pascual v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 911 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Roos v. Morrison, 913 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Grunow
v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 904 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Biglen v. Fla. Power &
Light Co., 910 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
4. See Vining, 354 So. 2d at 54; Hewitt, 912 So. 2d at 682; Roos, 913 So. 2d at 59.
5. See Franco, 947 So. 2d at 514; Almarante, 921 So. 2d at 703; Pascual, 911 So. 2d at
152.
6. 912 So. 2d at 682.
7. Id. at 683.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 683-84.
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26, 2001, [but] did not report it [as] stolen until April 5, 2001."" On April 7,
the car collided with the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger.' 2 At
the time of the accident, it was Avis's policy to not report a car as stolen until
thirty to forty-five days after it was missing to avoid "customer[s] legitimate-
ly in possession" from being charged with theft. 3 After the accident, Avis,
implemented security measures to prevent theft, which included "chang[ing]
gate locks, park[ing] vans in front of the gates, install[ing] security cameras,
and hir[ing] a night security guard."' 14
The defendant argued that it had no duty to prevent theft, and that the
theft was a superseding, intervening cause. 15 The court correctly analogized
this case to those involving vehicle owners leaving keys inside the vehicle.1
6
Although those cases referenced Florida's statute directing vehicle owners to
not "leave a vehicle unattended without removing the key," the court ex-
tended the rationale to other situations where a defendant creates a foreseea-
ble zone of risk.17 In this case, where theft was rampant, management failed
to take prompt action, and thefts were not promptly reported, the court
deemed it up to the fact finder to determine whether the "defendant's con-
duct created a foreseeable zone of risk, giving rise to a duty to lessen the
risk.""8 Since duty is a question of fact, it would be more accurate to say that
the jury should determine if the duty was breached, but holding that Avis
could be considered liable seemed appropriate. 9 The court also accurately
concluded that it was a jury question as to whether the intervening act of the
theft was a superseding cause.z
The First District Court of Appeal considered whether a vehicular pas-
senger could undertake a duty to others by providing advice to a driver in
Roos v. Morrison.2 ' The "plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle" struck
by a sport utility vehicle, in which the "[d]efendant, Christopher Morrison,
was a rear seat passenger. 2 2 Morrison was asked by the driver of the SUV if
11. Hewitt, 912 So. 2d at 684.
12. Id. at 684.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Hewitt, 912 So. 2d at 684 (citing Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d
54, 55 (Fla. 1977)).
17. Id. at 685-86.
18. Id. at 686.
19. See id. (citing Deese v. McKinnonville Hunting Club, Inc., 874 So. 2d 1282, 1287
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
20. See id.
21. 913 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
22. Id.
20081
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he could safely back up on a roadway, which was blocked by traffic. 23 The
court held that Morrison could be held liable if it was decided that he "agreed
to determine whether the . . . path of travel was clear and failed to use rea-
sonable care in making that determination." 24 Recognizing the potential im-
pact of transferring liability from "driver[s] with mandated insurance cover-
age to ... passenger[s] who may" not have coverage, the court certified to
the Supreme Court of Florida the following question as "one of great public
importance:"
MAY A VEHICULAR PASSENGER BE HELD LIABLE TO
ANOTHER VEHICULAR PASSENGER IN CIRCUMSTANCES
WHERE THE POTENTIALLY LIABLE PASSENGER WAS IN
A SUPERIOR POSITION TO THE DRIVER OF THAT
PASSENGER'S VEHICLE TO OBSERVE A POTENTIAL
HAZARD AND GAVE AFFIRMATIVE ADVICE TO THE
DRIVER WHICH RESULTED IN A COLLISION WITH THE
OTHER PASSENGER'S VEHICLE?25
What duty is owed by a utility company in providing power for traffic
signals? This issue was considered in Pascual v. Florida Power & Light
Co.,26 by the Third District Court of Appeal.27 Carlos "Pascual's vehicle
collided with a ... police car" at an intersection with "an inoperable traffic
signal., 28 Florida Power and Light (FPL) sent technicians to repair a trans-
former the day before the accident.29 The plaintiffs alleged that "the pres-
ence of rodent droppings around the transformer" should have caused the
utility company to realize that rodents were the cause of the power outages.3"
The plaintiffs also alleged that FPL negligently turned off "the grid and traf-
fic signal" when they returned to repair the transformer on the day of the
accident.3' FPL filed a motion to dismiss, denying that they owed a legal
duty to the plaintiffs.32 The court held that by undertaking to repair the failed
transformer, it "assumed a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner., 33 Fur-
ther, FPL assumed a duty to warn pursuant to its contractual agreement "with
23. Id.
24. Id. at 67.
25. Id. at 68.
26. 911 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
27. Id. at 153.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Pascual, 911 So. 2d at 153.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 154.
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the [c]ounty to notify them of . . power [outages] within 15 minutes or
less."34 However, the court refused to find that FPL had a duty "to maintain
electrical current to the intersection. 35
The Third District Court of Appeal found no duty to exist for a pharma-
cy in a case involving a motorist who fell asleep and collided with plaintiff's
vehicle in Dent v. Dennis Pharmacy, Inc.36 Garrett Dent "allege[d] that the
prescribing doctor told [Paula] Sparenberg not to drive while taking the [me-
dication]," but that the pharmacist "placed a 'use caution driving' label on
the prescription bottle," thus, negligently causing her to drive when she
should not have. 37 The plaintiff asserted that this created a voluntarily under-
taken duty by the pharmacy. 3 The court found that the pharmacy had done
no more than required by Florida law, and that Dent was an unknown or un-
identifiable third party beyond the foreseeable zone of risk.39
What duty does a school district owe a student injured on an alleged
field trip? The Third District Court of Appeal considered this in Fernandez
v. Florida National College, Inc.40 "Iris Yadira Fernandez... was injured
and her daughter, Claudia Lorena Fernandez ... died" in an accident in a
motor vehicle operated by Jorge Luis Cisneros, a teacher at Florida National
College (FNC).41 FNC offers classes in English for Speakers of Other Lan-
guages, which includes required field trips.42 Teachers are "required to sub-
mit a field trip authorization form to FNC" and students are "to submit a
signed form releasing FNC from liability. '43 Field trips were to "take place
during the scheduled class period," participation would affect grades, and
students were to "provide their own transportation." 44 Mr. Cisneros took the
students on a field trip to Key West after the end of the class period.45 He
"did not inform FNC [nor] ask the students to sign ... release[s]." 46 "[Tihe
excursion [also] did not affect the students' grades . . ,,47Mr. Cisneros
34. Id.
35. Id. at 155 (citing Levy v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 798 So. 2d 778,781 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
36. 924 So. 2d 927,928, 930 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
37. Id. at 928-29.
38. Id. at 929.
39. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 465.003(6) (2005); FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 64B 16-
27.820(1)(d), (e) (1993).
40. See 925 So. 2d 1096, 1100 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
41. Id. at 1098.
42. Id. at 1099.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Fernandez, 925 So. 2d at 1099.
46. Id.
47. Id.
2008]
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"us[ed] his personal credit card" to rent two vans that were used to transport
the students.48 "Mr. Cisneros lost control of the van" that he drove, in which
Mrs. Fernandez and her daughter were passengers.4 9 The court held that Mr.
Cisneros was not "acting within the course and scope of his employment"
and "the plaintiffs failed to allege that [he] was [acting as] FNC's apparent
agent at the time of the accident.,
50
The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed another duty issue in
Franco v. Miami-Dade County.51 A unit of Miami-Dade County Fire Rescue
arrived at the home of Ida Franco pursuant to a call concerning Wessner's
mother, Ida Franco." Franco was suffering from chest pains and Fire Rescue
determined that her condition was "'critical' and 'unstable.' 53 Wessner
asked that her mother be transported to South Miami Hospital where a cardi-
ologist was waiting to treat Franco.54 Instead, she was transported to "the
closest facility that provided" critical care pursuant to Fire Rescue protocol.5
The court ruled that Fire Rescue had a "duty when it diagnoses, treats, and
transports patients in... emergency situation[s]," but that it did not breach it
when it adhered to its protocol that determined "the closest appropriate hos-
pital."56
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the duty of a homeown-
ers association in regard to a tree that it had planted in Miami-Dade County
v. Deerwood Homeowners' Ass'n.57 Patricia Perdomo "tripped and fell on a
[c]ounty sidewalk."58 She and her husband "alleged that roots from a tree
near the sidewalk. . . created a vertical separation" that caused the fall.5 9 In
addition to suing the County, the plaintiffs also sued the Deerwood Home-
owners' Association that planted the tree and its lawn maintenance company,
Techlawn. ° The County argued that it, and the Perdomos, relied upon
Deerwood and Techlawn to maintain the tree.61 The court noted that the Su-
preme Court of Florida has previously "held that private landowners are not
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1099-100.
50. Fernandez, 925 So. 2d at 1100-01.
51. 947 So. 2d 512, 516-17 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
52. Id. at 514.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Franco, 947 So. 2d at 517.
57. 979 So. 2d 1103, 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
58. Id. at 1104.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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liable for injuries caused by subterranean roots growing under public rights-
of-way."62 Therefore, absent specific facts that showed that either "Deer-
wood or Techlawn undertook to maintain the" roots or repair the sidewalk,
the county could not show that either had voluntarily undertaken a duty.63
Gratuitous planting and maintaining of a tree for nine years was insuffi-
cient.64 The court noted that the pleadings did not allege that either party had
"trimmed a tree root near the sidewalk, repaired the sidewalk, or agreed with
the County to perform... such tasks. 65
In Grunow v. Valor Corp. of Florida,66 the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal considered the duty owed by a wholesale sporting goods distributor in
regard to a firearm legally sold.67 Pamela Grunow, "personal representative
of the estate of Barry Grunow, appeal[ed] .. . a final judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict" entered on behalf of the defendant.68 Nathaniel Brazill was a
suspended student, who retrieved a gun from his grandfather's bedroom and
returned to school to shoot his school counselor. 69 First, however, he stopped
at a classroom, in which Barry Grunow was the teacher, to speak to two of
his friends.70 When Grunow refused to permit the students to leave the class-
room, Brazill shot and killed him with a Raven MP-25, also known as a
"Saturday Night Special."71 Grunow's lawsuit claimed that Valor was "lia-
ble for failing to implement feasible safety mechanisms such as external
locks and/or lock boxes. 72 The court acknowledged that "Florida does not
recognize a cause of action for negligent distribution of a non-defective fire-
arm. 7 3 The court found that "no special relationship [existed] between Va-
lor and either Brazill or Grunow," that Brazill's criminal conduct was not
foreseeable, and that a product is not negligently designed 74 "because the
design used was not the safest possible. 75
62. Deerwood Homeowners' Ass'n, 979 So. 2d at 1104 (citing Sullivan v. Silver Palm
Props., Inc., 558 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1990)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Jd. at 1105.
66. 904 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
67. See id. at 553.
68. Id. at 553.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Grunow, 904 So. 2d at 553.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 554.
74. Id. at 556.
75. Id. (quoting Husky Indus., Inc. v. Black, 434 So. 2d 988, 991 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1983)).
2008]
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In Biglen v. Florida Power & Light Co.,76 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal also considered the duty element in relation to a utility company.77
The plaintiff, Michael Biglen, operated "an aerial lift machine, that came into
contact with an overhead power line owned and maintained by" Florida
Power & Light.78 Biglen's job "included parking the machines for storage
and ... raising the booms. ' 79 The power lines "were 'open and obvious to..
. the casual observer,"' and nothing blocked the plaintiffs line of vision.'
The court upheld the summary final judgment in favor of the defendant,
holding that it owed no duty to the aerial lift operator because:
[Ilt was not reasonably foreseeable that an employee would care-
lessly and unreasonably violate the company's guidelines, training,
and the clear warning labels on the machine itself, and lift the
boom far beyond the one or two feet necessary to complete the
task, so high that it contacted a power line.
81
In Horton v. Freeman,82 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed
the duty owed by a married couple to a minor child in their custody and care
while his mother attended to a family emergency.83 The plaintiff appealed
her dismissed complaint in the wrongful death action concerning her son's
death from a drug overdose.' The plaintiff alleged that "the defendants
created an environment for the use of drugs, . . . negligently allowed the use
of illegal drugs,... [and] failed to call an ambulance.... [or] provide appro-
priate care when they knew or should have known that the decedent had
overdosed. ' 5  The court held that the defendants voluntarily assumed "a
duty to care for and supervise a minor. ,86 It clarified that it was "not ex-
pand[ing] premises liability... [for] social host[s] to seek medical attention
for a guest unless [the] host... voluntarily undertak[es the] duty. 817
In Almarante v. Art Institute of Fort Lauderdale, Inc.,"8 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal considered the duty element owed by a private school
76. 910 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
77. Id. at 408.
78. Id. at 406.
79. Id. at 407.
80. Id.
81. Biglen, 91OSo. 2dat412.
82. 917 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
83. Id. at 1065.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1067.
87. Horton, 917 So. 2d at 1067.
88. 921 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
[Vol. 33
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to its students in a busy urban environment. 89 The plaintiff was "struck by a
speeding motorcycle" while crossing a busy highway, "returning to her resi-
dence." 90 The school dormitory buildings were constructed on each side of
the highway.9 "There [was] no pedestrian signal, cross-walk, bridge or other
safety device" to cross the highway.92 "Two previous accidents involving
pedestrian crossings [had] recently occurred ... [and s]chool officials [had]
contacted the Florida Department of Transportation" seeking installation of
safety devices.9 3 The student claimed that she was compelled to cross the
highway to conduct routine student functions. 94 The court reversed a dismis-
sal of the complaint, holding that the school's placement of its dormitories
"on either side of a busy urban highway, requiring [students to cross] on a
daily basis" created a foreseeable zone of danger.95
What duty is owed by a fitness center to a customer suffering a cardiac
event while using its equipment?96 The Fourth District Court of Appeal con-
sidered this duty in L.A. Fitness International, L.L.C. v. Mayer.97 "Alessio
Tringali died as a result of a cardiac arrest ... while using a stepping ma-
chine at L.A. Fitness .... 98 The defendant's sales representative "told the
receptionist to call 911 ."99 Because the representative believed "that Tringali
was having a seizure or a stroke," he did not attempt cardiopulmonary resus-
citation (CPR)."° The plaintiffs medical expert testified that the deceased's
"condition was treatable with defibrillation [and that] CPR could have been
'used to increase the likelihood"' that defibrillation would have been suc-
cessful when applied later.'0 ' Another expert testified that the defendant fell
below industry standards by not having a defibrillator, by not "screen[ing]
individuals prior to their commencing exercise and by failing to employ a
medical liaison."'0
2
89. See id. at 704.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Almarante, 921 So. 2d at 704.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 705.
96. See L.A. Fitness Int'l, L.L.C. v. Mayer, 980 So. 2d 550, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
97. Id. at 557.
98. Id. at 552.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 553.
102. Id. at 555.
2008]
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The court observed that "the duty owed by a health club owner" to a pa-
tron was a matter of first impression. 3 It reviewed cases from other juris-
dictions concerning the duty of business owners to injured patrons and found
that, as a general principle, "summoning medical assistance within a reason-
able time" is what is required.'0° The court held that even if it was required
to render first aid, it was not required "to perform skilled treatment, such as
CPR." 10 5 The court also refused to find that the defendant had a "duty to
have a defibrillator."' 6
The Fourth District reversed a jury verdict in a restaurant slip and fall
case in Izquierdo v. Gyroscope, Inc.1"7 Izquierdo obtained a verdict against
the defendant, owner and operator of Giorgio's Grill, where the plaintiff
"slipped and fell on a wet napkin.' 0 8 The "restaurant, which became a night
club after certain hours... had a tradition of both ... wait staff and custom-
ers [tossing] paper napkins into the air as the music played." "No one would
pick . . . up" the napkins from the floor, which sometimes became wet as
drinks were spilled.'09 The plaintiff had been to the restaurant five or six
times and "knew of the napkin-throwing tradition." ' 0 The jury found for the
defendant, finding "no negligence on its part." '' The appellate court re-
versed the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial, finding that the
verdict was "contrary to the undisputed evidence. 11 2 Although the plaintiff
was aware of the napkin-throwing tradition and the danger was arguably
open and obvious, the court held that such knowledge did not negate the de-
fendant's duty to make "reasonable efforts to keep the premises free from
transitory foreign objects."' 1 3
In Kazanjian v. School Board of Palm Beach County," 4 the Fourth Dis-
trict Court also considered the duty element in another school case; this one
involving a public high school." 5 The father of a student who was killed in a
car accident after she and her friends left the school without authorization,
103. Id. at 557.
104. Id. at 558.
105. Id. at 559.
106. Mayer, 980 So. 2d at 562.
107. 946 So. 2d 115, 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
108. Id. at 117.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Izquierdo, 946 So. 2d at 118.
113. Id. at 118 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.0710(1) (2004)).
114. 967 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
115. Id. at 261.
[Vol. 33
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brought suit against the school board. 1 6 Although the school made auto-
mated calls to parents when students were absent from class, the deceased
student's friend testified that the deceased intercepted the calls before her
parents could receive them." 7 The court refused to hold the school board
responsible for supervising students off school property. 1 8 After reviewing
similar cases from other jurisdictions, the court concluded that a high school
student skipping school does not "pose an 'unreasonable risk"' that creates a
duty." 9 The court further held that sovereign immunity applied to the School
Board because its decision concerning its attendance policies was a "discre-
tionary planning level polic[y]. ' 12°
In Luque v. Ale House Management, Inc.,12 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal considered the duty of a bar for serving alcohol to an obviously in-
toxicated person who was then injured in an automobile accident.122 "Luque
was a regular customer" of the Orlando Ale House. 23 On the day in ques-
tion, "he was served.., several beers."' 24 While driving home, a car "cut in
front of him," causing him to swerve and have an accident."2 The plaintiff
claimed that section 768.125 of the Florida Statutes, which states that "[a]
person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages" may be liable if he "kno-
wingly serves [someone] habitually addicted to the use of' alcohol and the
person is injured as a result of the intoxication, 26 defined a cause of action. 27
The court agreed that the plaintiff had a cause of action and denied the de-
fendant's argument that it could not be found to be the cause of the accident
because of the independent negligence of the driver who cut in front of the
plaintiff.
128
116. Id.
117. Id. at 262-63.
118. Id. at 264.
119. Kazanjian, 967 So. 2d at 267.
120. Id. at 268.
121. 962 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
122. Id. at 1063.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. FLA. STAT. § 768.125 (2007).
127. Luque, 962 So. 2d at 1063.
128. Id. at 1065-66.
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H. CAUSATION
Although generally a question of fact, appellate courts do review causa-
tion cases, particularly those involving questions of proximate cause.'29 The
question of when an intervening cause becomes a superseding one is a ques-
tion that is sometimes difficult to resolve. During the time period covered by
this article, a number of cases have arisen.
The Third District Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment on
proximate cause grounds in East Coast Electric v. Dunn.130 Allen Dunn and
Clifford Stewart, while employed by Florida Power and Light, "were se-
riously injured while testing an uncovered bus bar.' 13 ' The "bar was manu-
factured by General Electric [and] shipped . . . to East Coast without the
proper covers ('end caps').' ' 32 "East Coast, a licensed electrical contractor,"
installed the bus bars. 13 3 Dunn and Stewart sued both General Electric (GE)
and East Coast. 134 GE "filed motions for summary judgment," arguing that
East Coast's "'decision to supply power to the building,"' which caused a
"phase flash" that injured the plaintiffs, was a "superseding and intervening
cause" that absolved GE. 35 GE had warned East Coast "that the busway
system should not be energized."' 36 The court upheld the summary judgment
for GE, holding that East Coast's "act of energizing the busway system was
[reckless and] 'so far beyond the realm of foreseeability that, as a matter of
law and policy,' [GE could not] be held liable for the Plaintiffs' injuries."'137
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered a proximate cause issue
in a products liability case in Lindsey v. Bell South Telecommunications,
Inc. 38 Mark Lindsey, a mechanic, "used a tire changing machine" that was
supposed "to handle tires with a rim diameter of up to 20 inches," but was
problematic with "19 inch or 19.5 inch tires."' 39 Lindsey used a tire iron to
help the machine break the bead on the tire. 4° Other employees told the
plaintiff's employer that the machine was having problems with "19 and 19.5
129. E. Coast Elec. v. Dunn, 979 So. 2d 1018, 1021 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1019.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Dunn, 979 So. 2d at 1019.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1020.
137. Id. at 1021.
138. 943 So. 2d 963, 964-65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
139. Id. at 964.
140. Id.
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inch tires."'' Once, while using the tire iron, it slipped and Lindsey almost
fell over, which caused a herniated disk. 4 2 The manufacturer argued that
Lindsey's use of the metal bar was a superseding intervening cause.'43 The
court noted that the jury could have found that his conduct was not "'so un-
usual, extraordinary or bizarre"' as to relieve the defendant of liability. 4"
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the liability of the De-
partment of Children and Family Services (DCF) in regard to a child abuse
complaint in State v. Amora145 "[T]he Miami Children's Hospital (MCH)
called the DCF hotline because" of concern about a child, Marissa Amora,
who had been admitted to the hospital."* The child's x-ray revealed "a frac-
tured clavicle, for which the mother had no explanation.' ' 147 Despite this and
other concerns expressed to the Department, DCF failed "to contact the fa-
ther, to staff the case with a [Child Protection Team] and to conduct a home
study [before the child] was released from the hospital. ' 148 After release, the
child was physically abused by the mother's boyfriend, causing serious,
permanent injuries." 9 Marissa's adoptive parents sued DCF for negligently
investigating the complaint.50 DCF argued that it was not "the legal cause of
the injuries."'' The court ruled that there was competent substantial evi-
dence to support a verdict against the Department.
52
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered whether the deceased's
illegal conduct was a superseding cause in Kaminer v. Eckerd Corp. of Flor-
ida. 53 "Kaminer died as a result of ingesting Oxycontin" obtained from a
fraternity brother.5 4 "The fraternity brother got the drug from his roommate,
a pharmacy technician who had stolen it from his employer, Eckerd... Eck-
erd did not argue that it was not negligent, but [instead argued that the de-
ceased's] criminal conduct in ingesting the drug" precluded recovery.'55
Although "there was no evidence ... that [the deceased] knew the nature of
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Lindsey, 943 So. 2d at 965.
144. Id. at 965-66 (quoting Goldberg v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 899 So. 2d 1105, 1116
(Fla. 2005)).
145. 944 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 433.
148. Id. at 435.
149. Id.
150. Amora, 944 So. 2d at 435.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 436.
153. 966 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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the drug," the court held that "knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled
substance can be presumed from actual possession."' 56 The court further
agreed that the criminal conduct of the deceased did absolve Eckerd of liabil-
ity.'
57
IV. IMPACT RULE
Over the years, the impact rule has caused disagreement and confusion
in Florida appellate courts. 58 This has continued to be the trend in recent
decisions.'59 During the past three years, the Supreme Court of Florida has
issued two opinions concerning its scope."6 In addition, the district courts
have also tried to discern when it should be applied.' 6' The debate about
what types of causes should not be bound by the rule also continues.
The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed a conflict amongst the district
courts concerning the impact rule in Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, L.L. C. '
62
The Court reviewed an appeal of a "summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant[]," the hotel. 63 The plaintiff, Mrs. Willis, was robbed at gunpoint in
a parking lot across the street from the hotel, which the plaintiff asserted was
the location where she was instructed to park and assured that it was safe by
the security guard employed by the service that was contracted to provide
security to the hotel.' 64 "[A] gun was placed to her head as she" exited her
rental car and the gunman also instructed her to lift her clothing as he
"patt[ed] down her exposed body."'' 65  She also claimed that "the security
guard refused to provide assistance" after the robbery. 66 The Court, in a per
curiam opinion, held that a negligence case could proceed because the plain-
156. Id. (citing Scott v. State, 808 So. 2d 166, 171 (Fla. 2002)).
157. Kaminer, 966 So. 2d at 454-55.
158. See Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Abril, 969 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam); Willis
v. Gami Golden Glades, L.L.C. (Willis II), 967 So. 2d 846, 847-48 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
159. See generally id.
160. See id.
161. See Brady v. SCI Funeral Servs. of Fla., Inc., 948 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007); Reiser v. Wachovia Corp., 935 So. 2d 1236, 1236 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(per curiam); Matsumoto v. Am. Burial & Cremation Servs., Inc., 949 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Woodard v. Jupiter Christian Sch., Inc. (Woodard 1), 913 So. 2d
1188, 1190 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
162. Willis I, 967 So. 2d at 846, 848.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 848-49 (citing Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, L.L.C. (Willis 1), 881 So. 2d 703,
704 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
165. Id. at 849 (citing Willis I, 881 So. 2d at 704).
166. Id. (citing Willis 1, 881 So. 2d at 704).
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tiff had "sustained multiple types of contact [that] qualify as an impact." '67
Chief Justice Lewis, in a concurring opinion, sought to clarify that a physical
injury is not required when there has been an impact upon the plaintiffs per-
son.'68 Justice Pariente agreed with this interpretation of the rule, but con-
curred to express her opinion that the Court should recede from the rule.169
She would replace it with a traditional foreseeability analysis. 70 On the oth-
er hand, Justice Wells argued in dissent that the rule required the Court to
"objectively test[] the reliability of claims for emotional distress," which he
apparently believes requires a "physical injury or manifestation."'' Similar-
ly, Justice Cantero argued in dissent that the rule in Florida has always re-
quired "physical injury or 'manifestation."" 72 After reviewing the case law
and disagreeing with the interpretations of that line of cases by the majority
and concurring opinions, he argued that if some physical manifestation is no
longer required, then the plaintiff should be required to "prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that she [sustained] severe emotional distress" which
was foreseeable.'73
The Supreme Court of Florida also reviewed the rule's application in an
HIV claim in Florida Department of Corrections v. Abril.174 The plaintiff, "a
senior licensed practical nurse at the Hendry County Correctional Institution
(HCCI), [gave] unprotected mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to an inmate,"
who "was infected with hepatitis C.' 75 Abril sought to have HIV and hepa-
titis testing "through the department's workers' compensation [center],
which declined ... because it [decided] that the resuscitation did not expose
her to a risk of infection."'' 76 "[T]he institution's chief medical officer sub-
mitted a blood sample ... to ... a laboratory under contract with the State..
.,,1 The laboratory faxed results indicating that Abril had tested positive
for HIV to "unsecured fax machine[s] in the institution's business office and
... in ... the [Department of Corrections'] offices of Chief Health Servic-
es."'1 78 A number of employees not authorized to receive the results became
167. Willis 11, 967 So. 2d at 850.
168. Id. at 855 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
169. Id. at 861 (Pariente, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 863.
171. Id. at 864-65 (Wells, J., dissenting).
172. Willis 11, 967 So. 2d at 877 (Cantero, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 876-77.
174. 969 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam).
175. Id. at 203.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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aware of them.179 It was later determined that the test results were a false
positive and therefore incorrect. 8 °  The plaintiff argued that section
381.004(3)(f), Florida Statutes, which outlines that 1I1V test results are con-
fidential, created a duty on the part of the defendant.18 ' The Court agreed
that this statute, along with those recognizing confidentiality in medical
records, created a duty to handle the test results with reasonable care.' 82 It
also ruled that the impact rule does not bar the action because the damages
arising from the statutory breach would be emotional in nature.'83 In a con-
curring opinion, Justice Pariente repeated her argument that the impact rule
should be replaced with a traditional foreseeability analysis."8 Similarly,
Justice Cantero argued that the Court should not continue to create ad hoc
fact-specific exceptions.'85 Justice Bell argued in dissent that creating a new
tort cause of action in addition to the criminal and administrative remedies
provided by the statute was contrary to legislative intent.186
The First District Court of Appeal reviewed claims for negligent han-
dling of a dead body in Brady v. SCI Funeral Services of Florida, Inc. 187 The
court reversed a directed verdict in favor of the defendant funeral service,
which acknowledged that it had buried the plaintiffs' newborn son in an un-
lawfully shallow grave. 188 The trial court had ruled that the "impact rule
precluded an award . . . under a negligence [claim]." '189 The appellate court
held that the plaintiffs could proceed under a negligence claim where the
"alleged misconduct is willful and wanton," rejecting the trial court's re-
quirement that a claim be made of "gross negligence, or tortious interference
with a dead body." 19°
Who qualifies as a close personal relative for the purpose of bringing an
emotional distress claim? The First District Court of Appeal considered
whether stepchildren could qualify in Watters v. Walgreen Co. 91 The appel-
lants claimed that the pharmacy negligently provided instructions "on pre-
scription pain medication," resulting in their stepfather dying from an over-
179. Abril, 969 So. 2d at 203.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 205.
182. Id. at 205-06.
183. Id. at 207-08.
184. Abril, 969 So. 2d at 208 (Pariente, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 212 (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Id. at 216 (Bell, J., dissenting).
187. 948 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
188. Id. at 978-79.
189. Id. at 978.
190. Id. at 978-79.
191. 967 So. 2d 930, 931 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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dose. 9 2 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants in the
negligent infliction of emotional distress action because the appellants were
not related by blood or adoption.'93 The First District Court of Appeal con-
cluded that this interpretation was too narrow and the close family relation-
ship requirement needed to be assessed on a "case-by-case" basis, rejecting
interpretations from the "Third and Fourth District[s] ... to the extent that
they require[d] a formal 'legal relationship."fl94
In Matsumoto v. American Burial & Cremation Services, Inc., ' the
Second District Court of Appeal decided an appeal that reviewed a directed
verdict in favor of the defendant funeral home in an emotional distress
case. 196 The case was filed by Ms. Matsumoto claiming that the defendant
had "tortiously interfered with the body of her deceased father" by cremating
it. 197 The court determined that the claim was not one "for outrageous con-
duct causing severe emotional distress." 198 The plaintiff had been estranged
and not in contact with her father for over two years, but claimed that he
desired a "military funeral and burial."' 99 On the other hand, the deceased's
companion, who "held a general power of attorney," and the deceased's
brother, testified that the deceased had directed "them to cremate his re-
mains. ' '200 The court correctly held that the conduct of the funeral home was
not only not outrageous, but in fact in compliance with section 470.002(18),
Florida Statutes, which specifies that a deceased body is to be disposed of by
the "legally authorized person," who was, in this case, the deceased's broth-
er.201 The court further held that the funeral home was not under "a due dili-
gence requirement" to search for relatives of a higher priority, such as the
daughter in this case, whom the brother and companion had claimed had no
knowledge of how to contact Ms. Matsumoto. °2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered a "negligent infliction
of emotional distress" claim in Woodard v. Jupiter Christian School, Inc.
(Woodard 1)203 "The minor plaintiff was a student at the [defendant's institu-
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 933-34.
195. 949 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
196. Id. at 1055-56.
197. Id. at 1056.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Matsumoto, 949 So. 2d at 1056.
201. Id. at 1057 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 470.002(18) (2002) (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. 913 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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tion], a private Bible-centered school .... ,,2o4 Administrators at the school
directed Todd Bellhorn, a secondary teacher/chaplain, "to question and coun-
sel [the plaintiff] about his sexual orientation. ' '20 5  "Bellhorn assured the
[plaintiff that] their conversation was confidential. 2 °6 The plaintiff "dis-
close[d that] he was homosexual. '2 7 "Bellhorn relayed the information to..
. school[] administrators, who ...disclosed the information to others ...
[and] expelled the student .... "20 The plaintiff claimed that he "was berated
by the press and the [school's] president.., and shunned by his schoolmates
as a result of the disclosure." 2°9 The plaintiff argued that the court should
recognize it as another exception to the impact rule, analogous to the excep-
tion approved by the Supreme Court of Florida for breaches of confidentiali-
ty between a psychotherapist and patient in Gracey v. Eaker.210 The court
declined to create another exception and instead certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida the following question: "Does the impact rule preclude a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of the breach
of confidential information provided to a clergyman? ' 21,
Judge Stone concurred, arguing "that a teacher designated as a 'chap-
lain' . . . even [at] a Christian school, is not a [clergy] member. ' 212 On the
other hand, Judge Farmer dissented, arguing that "the impact rule does not
apply [in cases] in which the injury is predominantly emotional... 'such as.
invasion of privacy [cases]." 213 Thus, he opined that it should "not apply
to breach of confidentiality" cases, such as allegedly occurred in this case.21 4
The Supreme Court of Florida discharged jurisdiction of the case-
leaving it somewhat clear what their position on the issue might be.2 15 Jus-
tice Pariente dissented to the discharge, arguing that the Fourth District Court
of Appeal's opinion is at odds with the Supreme Court of Florida's decisions
in Gracey and Abril, discussed above.216 Justice Pariente repeated her asser-
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1190.
207. Id.
208. Woodard 1, 913 So. 2d at 1190.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 356 (Fla. 2002) (stating that breach of
confidentiality between psychotherapist and patient was an exception to the impact rule).
211. Id. at 1191-92.
212. Id. at 1192 (Stone, J., concurring).
213. Woodward 1, 913 So. 2d at 1192 (Farmer, J., dissenting) (quoting Kush v. Lloyd, 616
So. 2d 415, 422 (Fla. 1992)).
214. Id. at 1194.
215. See Woodard v. Jupiter Christian Sch. (Woodard If), 972 So. 2d 170, 170 (Fla. 2007)
(per curiam).
216. Id. (Pariente, J., dissenting).
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tion that Florida should abandon the impact rule.2 17 Further, she argued that
the "case is substantially similar to [other cases where the Court has] recog-
nized exceptions to the impact rule. 218 As explained by Justice Pariente, the
treatment received by Woodard by the press, the president of the school, and
his schoolmates "'is at least equal to that typically suffered by the victim of a
defamation or an invasion of privacy. '219 Certainly, it should be no more
difficult to recognize that emotional distress probably resulted from "the
breach of the confidentiality in this case" than it was in the Gracey and Abril
cases. 220  Further, as the dissent points out, the discharge leaves unclear
whether the Court was deciding that the impact rule precluded recovery or
that the plaintiff did not have "a valid underlying cause of action" in regard
to the act of the teacher.22'
The Fifth District Court of Appeal applied the impact rule in Reiser v.
Wachovia Corp.,222 in which Scott Reiser, the plaintiff, "was confronted in
the bank's lobby by four hooded, armed" bank robbers.2 3 One of the "gun-
men held a rifle" to Reiser's head while the other robbers opened the vault
and stole cash. 24  Reiser claimed emotional trauma, but "[t]he trial court
entered summary judgment in favor of the bank., 225 The appellate court held
that a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim cannot be recognized
"in the absence of a physical impact or injury. 226
V. DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES
The liability for the use of a dangerous instrumentality has been ad-
dressed in a number of cases. 227 As will be seen, at least one case has also
considered the impact of federal legislation in this doctrinal area.228 What
217. Id. at 171.
218. Id.
219. Id. (quoting Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 356 (Fla. 2002)).
220. See Woodard II, 972 So. 2d at 171.
221. Id. at 172 n.I.
222. 935 So. 2d 1236, 1236 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See generally Kumarsingh v. PV Holding Corp., 983 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2008); Saullo v. Douglas, 957 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Estate of Villa-
nueva v. Youngblood, 927 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Ming v. Interamerican
Car Rental, Inc., 913 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Fischer v. Alessandrini, 907
So. 2d 569 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Festival Fun Parks, L.L.C. v. Gooch, 904 So. 2d 542
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
228. See Kumarsingh, 983 So. 2d at 601.
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vehicles should be considered dangerous instrumentalities for purposes of
this doctrine has also been considered.229
The Second District Court of Appeal considered the impact of legisla-
tive modifications of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Fischer v.
Alessandrini.2 ° "Dean James Alessandrini was killed after Jeffrey Salerno,"
who was driving a truck belonging to Salerno's father-in-law, John Fischer,
hit the motorcycle driven by Alessandrini. 23' Fischer had loaned the truck to
his son, who then lent it to the defendant. 32 The court held that the legisla-
tion's limit on liability was applicable in this case.233 It rejected the trial
court's interpretation that Fischer was not protected because he did not lend
the truck to Salerno, noting that the doctrine to which this limitation applied
made owners liable for use by someone other than the original permissive
user.
234
The Second District Court of Appeal also considered an appeal in a
dangerous instrumentality case in Estate of Villanueva v. Youngblood.235 T.
Patton "Youngblood took [his] Lexus to Extreme Auto Sales & Accessories,
Inc., and consigned it there for sale. 236 One of the latter's principals, Teddy
Aponte, drove the car home and to a Christmas party where he "was in-
volved in [an] accident that killed Mr. [Reinaldo] Villanueva. ' '237 Although
Youngblood did not expressly limit Extreme Auto's use, he assumed that it
,"238 cutrfsd"oetn h
would be used "solely for test drives. The court refused "to extend the
'shop' exception to the" dangerous instrumentality doctrine to this situa-
tion.239 The court also held that summary judgment was not appropriate for
Youngblood on the issue of whether "the theft or conversion exception" was
appropriate and on the issue of the scope of the consent.2'
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the impact of the federal
Graves Amendment upon the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Kumar-
singh v. PV Holding Corp.24 "Juan Ortiz crashed his rental car into the Ku-
229. See Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071, 1071, 1072 (Fla. 1984).
230. 907 So. 2d at 571.
231. Id. at 570.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 571-72 (interpreting FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b)(3) (2005)).
234. Id.
235. 927 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
236. Id. at 956.
237. Id. at 957.
238. Id. at 956.
239. Id. at 959.
240. Villanueva, 927 So. 2d at 960.
241. 983 So. 2d 599, 600 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting 49 U.S.C. § 30106
(2005)).
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marsinghs' vehicle," injuring Mr. Kumarsingh. 242 "The plaintiffs filed suit
against [the defendants,] ... alleging vicarious liability as owners/lessors of
the car, and negligent entrustment. ''243 The appellate court held that the act
"supersedes and abolishes all state vicarious liability laws as... appl[ied] to
lessors of motor vehicles for causes of action filed ... after ... the effective
date of [the] statute," August 10, 2005.2'
In Festival Fun Parks, L.L C. v. Gooch,245 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal considered whether "a go-kart amusement ride operated on an en-
closed track" could be considered a dangerous instrumentality. 246 The plain-
tiff was injured when his go-kart crashed into a wall after being bumped by
another go-kart driven by an unidentified driver.247 Concession go-karts at
such tracks "range in top speed from 14 MPH at a family-type track to 18-20
MPH at tracks ... for older drivers. 248 The court looked at various Florida
Statutes that define "motor vehicle" and concluded that a go-kart amusement
ride did not fit comfortably in those definitions, but acknowledged that such
definitions were not controlling in any event. 249 Instead, it examined whether
the instrumentality was "peculiarly dangerous in its operation" and compared
the go-kart to golf carts,25° which were deemed by the Supreme Court of
Florida to be dangerous instrumentalities in Meister v. Fisher.25 ' The court
noted that golf carts were extensively regulated similar to automobiles and
that they were capable of causing serious injury.252 By contrast, the court did
not feel that this type of go-kart was similar in either of these aspects. 253 It,
therefore, "conclude[d] that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine does not
apply to concession go-karts. ''2M
In Ming v. Interamerican Car Rental, Inc.,255 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal also addressed the dangerous instrumentality doctrine 6.25  The defen-
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 601.
245. 904 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
246. Id. at 544.
247. Id. at 543.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 545.
250. Festival Fun Parks, LLC., 904 So. 2d at 544-46 (citing Meister v. Fisher, 462 So.
2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 1984); S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 631 (Fla. 1920)).
251. 462 So. 2d at 1071.
252. Festival Fun Park, LL.C., 904 So. 2d at 546.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 913 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
256. Id. at 653.
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dant, Interamerican, rented a car to Callie Robinson.257 Robinson's daughter,
Leslie, struck and killed Robert Doyle in the rental car on the way "to her
mother's workplace." '258 Leslie was on probation and had her driver's license
revoked "at the time of the accident." '59 Callie never gave express permis-
sion to her daughter to drive the car.260 The court noted that rental car com-
panies were still responsible for damages caused by the operation of the ren-
tal vehicle unless the breach of custody of the vehicle amounted to conver-
sion or theft. 261 The court reversed the summary judgment entered on behalf
of Interamerican, because of "issue[s] of material fact on the [conversion]
issue. These included the fact that the car was used "during the rental
term," neither Interamerican nor Callie reported the car as stolen prior to or
after the accident, "Interamerican made no demand to possess the car," and
"Leslie was driving the car to give it to her mother" so she "had no intent to
possess the car ... longer than necessary to" give possession to the autho-
rized driver. 63 Chief Judge Pleus dissented on this part of the holding be-
cause he deemed it unreasonable to believe that Interamerican would have
agreed to permit Leslie to drive the car with a suspended license and that it
had no knowledge of her use prior to the accident.264 The court also reversed
the summary judgment entered on behalf of Callie Robinson because it be-
lieved there was evidence to support implied consent to drive the car because
she knew that Leslie had driven her vehicles previously, the keys were argu-
ably left in the open, there was a familial relationship, and her conduct after
the accident reflected a lack of consent.265
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered this doctrine as applied to
the lessee of the tractor of a tractor-trailer in Saullo v. Douglas.266 "Jessie
Douglas, a professional truck driver, was driving a tractor-trailer rig .... 267
"[T]he trailer was fully owned by Dart" Transit Company, but "[t]he tractor
was owned by Mr. Douglas" and permanently leased to Dart. 268 Douglas
"detached the trailer in the far right-hand lane of a four-lane roadway" so that
257. Id. at 652.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Ming, 913 So. 2d at 652.
261. Id. at 653 (citing Stupak v. Winter Park Leasing, Inc., 585 So. 2d 283, 284 (Fla.
1991)).
262. Id. at 654.
263. Id. at 655.
264. Id. at 658 (Pleus, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. Ming, 913 So. 2d at 657-58.
266. 957 So. 2d 80, 82 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
267. Id.
268. Id.
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he could use the tractor to help his brother remove his brother's car from
mud in which it was stuck.269 Douglas "directed his brother's girlfriend to
park her car behind the trailer and to activate the [car's] emergency" [flash-
ing signals]. aT Saullo swerved his automobile in order "to avoid the trailer
and the automobile," and was killed when his car "slammed into a tree." '271
The court first discussed competing interpretations of federal statutes and
regulations governing the liability of interstate motor carriers in regard to
leased vehicles.272 Some courts had interpreted the regulations to impose
strict liability upon the lessees, while others only held the carrier liable if the
driver was acting within the scope of his employment. 273 The court con-
cluded that the latter view was the better interpretation. 274  The appellate
court concluded that the trial court had correctly concluded that "Douglas
was not acting within the scope of his employment" in leaving the trailer on
the roadway in order to extricate his brother's car from the mud.275 Never-
theless, as lessee of the tractor, and as the entity that permitted Douglas to
operate it, the court held that Dart was in the best position to assure safe op-
eration and was "subject to vicarious liability for" Douglas' negligence. 276
VI. TOBACCO CASES
The Supreme Court of Florida again visited the ongoing tobacco litiga-
tion in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.277 As previously discussed in earlier
summaries in this law review, Florida courts have been dealing with litiga-
tion against tobacco companies for the past few years.278 In addition to the
Engle case, the district courts are also reviewing tort claims brought against
various cigarette-makers. 279 The Supreme Court of Florida case involved a
number of issues and split the court on some of them.280
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 82.
272. Id. at 84.
273. Id. at 84-85.
274. Id. at 86.
275. Id.
276. Saullo, 957 So. 2d at 87.
277. 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
278. See, e.g., William E. Adams, Jr., Tort Law: 2001-2003 Survey of Florida Law, 28
NOVA L. REV. 317, 327-30 (2004) [hereinafter Adams, Tort Law I ].
279. See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1282 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
280. Id. at 1254-55.
2008]
23
Adams: Tort Law: 2005-08 Review of Florida Case Law
Published by NSUWorks, 2008
NOVA LAW REVIEW
The case originated as a nationwide class action of smokers and their
survivors, but the Third District "reduced the class to" Florida smokers.281
The trial court then divided this complex action into three separate trial phas-
es.282 "Phase I consisted of a year-long trial [devoted entirely to] the issues
of liability and entitlement to punitive damages [to] the class as a whole., 283
On July 7, 1999, "the jury rendered a verdict for the Engle Class and against"
the tobacco companies on all counts. 284 "Phase II was divided into two
[parts] .... ,,285 Phase 1-A was to resolve "entitlement and amount of com-
pensatory damages [to] the three individual class representatives-Frank
Amodeo, Mary Farnan, and Angie Della Vecchia. ' '286 Phase 11-B was to
determine the "total lump sum punitive damage award... [to] the class as a
whole.
287
"At the conclusion of Phase 11-A, the jury" awarded a total of $12.7
million dollars in compensatory damages offset by the comparative fault of
the individual class members.2 88 At the conclusion of Phase 11-B, the jury
awarded a lump sum to the entire class of $145 billion in punitive damag-
es.289 Post verdict motions and appeals followed. °
First, the Court addressed the claim by defendants of the res judicata ef-
fect of the settlement agreement reached by the State of Florida and many of
the defendants in this action in a prior lawsuit filed by the State in 1995,
seeking reimbursement of Medicaid funds expended to treat victims of to-
bacco-related illnesses.29 Several theories were advanced in the suit, which
also sought punitive damages. 292 Settlement was reached in 1997.293 The
Court unanimously concluded that the settlement agreement between the
State of Florida and many of the defendants in that case did not preclude a
punitive damages award in this case because "the Engle Class relied on...
injuries personal to the class members," as opposed to the claims of the State
based on the general interest of all citizens. 294
281. Id. at 1256.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1256-57.
285. Id. at 1257.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1257.
290. Id. at 1257-58.
291. Id. at 1258.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1261.
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"A majority of the Court ([Justices] Anstead, Pariente, Lewis, and
Quince) conclude[d] that an award of compensatory damages [was] not [re-
quired before] a finding of entitlement to punitive damages. 2 95 This is be-
cause this group believed that the two types of awards serve distinct purpos-
es.296 A different majority-Justices "Wells, Anstead, Pariente, and Bell-
conclude[d, however, that] a finding of liability is required before [an] en-
titlement to punitive damages can be determined, and that liability is more
than a breach of duty."297 Further, the Court determined that the amount of
"the punitive damages award[ed] was. . . excessive. '"298 Although declining
"to impose a bright-line ratio" between the amount of compensatory damag-
es and punitive damages, the Court found the disparity between the two in
this case to violate constitutional notions of due process. 299 It explained that
"few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensa-
tory damages, to a significant degree," would satisfy this standard.300 Thus,
the ratio of 145 to 1 in this case was problematic. 30 1 Further, it stated that
before determining the appropriateness of the amount of the punitive damag-
es, as opposed to simply entitlement to the same, a determination of the
compensatory damages for the entire class needed to be made, as opposed to
the assessment here of compensatory damages for the three representatives
alone.0
2
The Court agreed with the Third District that the original trial plan
needed to be altered.30 3 Originally, Phase IH of the trial was "to decide the
individual liability and compensatory damages claim[] for each" member of
the class--estimated to be approximately 700,000.304 The Court concluded
that continued treatment of the matter as a class action was not feasible be-
cause of individualized issues of "legal causation, comparative fault, and
damages., 30 5 The Court held that class members could individually litigate
their claims with "the Phase I common core findings ... hav[ing] res judicata
effect in those [individual] trials. ''3°6 These would not include findings of
fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages,
295. Id. at 1262.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1265 n.8.
299. See Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1264-65.
300. Id. at 1264.
301. Id. at 1265.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1258.
305. Id. at 1268.
306. Id. at 1269.
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which the Court deemed to require individualized determinations. 3 7 The
Court also reminded trial counsel to guard against improper arguments, al-
though it declined to reverse the judgments because of the statements made
in this case.30 8 The Court noted that some of counsel's arguments that were
race-based or pled for nullification of the law had been subject to successful
objection. °9
The Second District considered the application of design defect theory
to tobacco cases in Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Arnitz.310 Arnitz, who ob-
tained a jury verdict, argued that the cigarettes were defectively designed
because of a curing process that increased the level of carcinogenic sub-
stances in the tobacco and additives that made them easier to inhale and in-
creased the speed of nicotine absorption into the cells.311 The court rejected
the defendant's argument that federal law pre-empted "the design defect
claim."
312
The Fourth District has also considered the application of tort law to to-
bacco cases in Ferlanti v. Liggett Group, Inc.3 13 It also held that the plaintiff
was not pre-empted from bringing tort claims in tobacco cases.314 Further, it
reversed the summary judgment for the defendants because there were ge-
nuine issues of material fact concerning the design of the cigarettes and
"whether the risks associated with smoking cigarettes were open, obvious,
and common knowledge. ,31 5 Finally, it ruled, that judicial notice of "wheth-
er the dangers of smoking were common knowledge [was inappropriate]
when ruling on the" summary judgment motion.316
The Fourth District further considered the application of Engle and the
other Florida tobacco cases in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Davis.3 17 Liggett ap-
pealed a jury verdict in favor of Beverly Davis, who prevailed on the theories
of negligence and defective design.31 8 Davis smoked Chesterfield cigarettes
from 1951-74.319 "In 2001, [she] was diagnosed with lung cancer., 320 Her
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1271.
309. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1273 (agreeing that some of the remarks injecting race into the
case were improper).
310. 933 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 698.
313. 929 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
314. Id. at 1174.
315. Id. at 1175.
316. Id. at 1176.
317. 973 So. 2d 467,470-73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
318. Id. at 469.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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negligence claim was based upon her argument that Liggett was negligent in
continuing to manufacture cigarettes after it became known that cigarettes
posed a significant health risk to smokers. 32' Liggett argued that the negli-
gence claim was pre-empted by federal law, which permits the continued
production of cigarettes. 322 The court agreed that the negligence claim in this
case was barred because Congress had refused to ban tobacco products and
the allowance of negligence claims for continued production, therefore, con-
flicted with congressional intent.
32 3
The court next addressed the strict liability design defect claim. 324 First,
the court held that the federal government's decision to permit the continued
manufacture of cigarettes prevented the application of the risk-utility test to
this particular design defect claim, even if Florida ultimately recognized it as
an appropriate test for other design defect cases.325 The court next addressed
how the ordinary consumer test applied to this claim. 326 The trial court had
instructed the jury in regard to this claim that '"[a] product is unreasonably
dangerous because of its design if the product fails to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect, when used as intended or in a manner rea-
sonably foreseeable by the manufacture." '' 327 It rejected Liggett's claim that
plaintiffs must prove that its cigarettes presented dangers greater than that
"expected by the ordinary consumer., 328 Although Congress recognized in
1968 that health risks existed and ordered warnings on cigarette packs, the
court noted that there was evidence presented up until that time that "the
average consumer may not have known of the dangers., 329 The court also
rejected Liggett's argument that the plaintiff was required to prove a safer
alternative design, and instead stated that it was a factor to consider in design
defect cases.33°
VII. RELEASES
In 2003, the Forth District Court of Appeal ruled that a mother could
not bind her child to an agreement "to arbitrate potential personal injury
321. Id. at 470.
322. Davis, 973 So. 2d at 470.
323. Id. at 472-73.
324. Id. at 470.
325. Id. at 474.
326. Id. at 474-75.
327. Davis, 973 So. 2d at 470.
328. Id. at 474.
329. Id. at 474-75.
330. Id. at 475.
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claims" in Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc.331 Since that case, Florida
district courts have tried to determine the limits of its holding.332 This sec-
tion will review some of those cases which have tried to discern which crite-
ria will void a waiver provision signed by a parent of a minor child.
The Second District Court of Appeal considered the enforceability of an
exculpatory clause in a release in Murphy v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of
Lake Wales, Inc.3 33 When Elizabeth Murphy joined the YMCA, she signed a
waiver "which include[d] the following ... provision[s]: . . . 'I understand
that even when every reasonable precaution is taken, accidents can some-
times still happen. .. I understand that this release includes any claims based
on negligence.'
334
Murphy was injured "while using exercise equipment at the YMCA[]"
facility.335 Noting that "[e]xculpatory clauses are disfavored and ... con-
strued against the party claiming" waiver,336 the court ruled that the "reason-
able reader might be led to believe that the waiver [only] extends ... to...
injuries that were unavoidable 'even when every reasonable precaution' had
been taken. 3 37 Therefore, summary judgment for the defendant was re-
versed.338
The Third District also considered the enforceability of a waiver provi-
sion signed by a parent in Krathen v. School Board of Monroe County.339
Krathen and her parent signed a release from liability so that Krathen could
participate as a cheerleader. 340 She was injured during a practice.34' After
reviewing other district court cases and the Shea case, the court held that this
release was binding because the parent in this case had decided that cheer-
leading was a beneficial activity for her daughter.342
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the ability of parents to
bind their children with pre-injury releases in Fields v. Kirton.3 43 "Bobby
331. 870 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 908 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2005).
332. See, e.g., Fields v. Kirton, 961 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007);
Krathen v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe County, 972 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
333. 974 So. 2d 565,566 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 567-68 (citing Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 580 So.
2d 628, 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Theis v. J & J Racing Promotions., 571 So. 2d 92,
94 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
337. Id. at 567-68.
338. Murphy, 974 So. 2d at 569.
339. 972 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 889.
343. 961 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
[Vol. 33
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss1/3
REVIEW OF FLORIDA TORT CASE LAW
Jones was the primary residential parent for his fourteen year old son, Chris-
topher." 344 Christopher lost control of his all terrain vehicle at the Thunder
Cross Motor Sports Park, and was killed in the accident.3 5 His father had
signed a release for the activity. 346 The court, referencing cases such as
Shea, acknowledged that parents may execute waivers for "obtaining medi-
cal care, insurance, or participation in school or community sponsored activi-
ties. 347 The court, however, indicated that these waivers were different from
one which "impacts the minor's estate and... property rights. 348 The court
held that "a pre-injury release executed by a parent" will not be enforced. 349
The court recognized that the decision conflicted with one from the Fifth
District.35° The court, therefore, certified the following question to the Su-
preme Court of Florida:
WHETHER A PARENT MAY BIND A MINOR'S
ESTATE BY THE PRE-INJURY EXECUTION OF A
RELEASE.35'
The Southern District of Florida also attempted to discern Florida law
on parental releases for minors' injuries in In re Complaint of Royal Carib-
bean Cruises Ltd.35 2 The father and his son were injured when the jet ski that
they rented from an entity owned by Royal Caribbean was hit by another jet
ski, also rented from the same entity.353 After reviewing the Florida case law
discussed in this article, it held that this was "a private activity provided by a
for-profit business" and therefore the release signed by the father could "not
be enforced against his minor child. ' '35 Despite winning on this issue, the
court granted summary judgment because the plaintiffs were unable to dem-
onstrate negligence by the defendants.355
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1129 (citing In re Complaint of Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 403 F. Supp. 2d
1168, 1173 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
348. Fields, 961 So. 2d at 1129-30.
349. Id. at 1130.
350. Contra Lantz v. Iron Horse Saloon, Inc., 717 So. 2d 590, 592 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1998); see id.
351. Fields, 961 So. 2d at 1130.
352. 403 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1169 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
353. Id. at 1169-70.
354. Id. at 1173.
355. Id.
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VIII. IMMUNITY
Florida courts have also had the opportunity to decide when the persons
or entities who engage in tortuous conduct are immunized from liability.
This has most often arisen in regard to actions by governmental agents acting
within the scope of their duties. Who qualifies and what types of actions are
protected have been reviewed in a number of cases during the time period
covered by this article.
In Jibory v. City of Jacksonville,356 the First District Court of Appeal re-
fused to permit sovereign immunity or a good faith defense from allowing
the plaintiff's case to proceed beyond summary judgment.357 Jibory brought
a false imprisonment claim for an arrest on a warrant that was void because
he had previously been arrested on the warrant over two years earlier.358 The
City had "failed to delete the warrant from its computer records., 359 The
City argued "that it had no legal duty under principles of sovereign immunity
to accurately maintain its records and that [its] officers ...acted in good
faith., 360 The court rejected the arguments that the defendant had no duty or
was protected by sovereign immunity.361 Because the warrant was void be-
cause it had previously been executed, the court also refused to allow the
City to claim the good faith defense.362
The First District Court addressed another immunity issue in regards to
child abuse reports in the case of Urquhart v. Helmich,363 which involved an
appeal of a final summary judgment of a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in a claim against a doctor who erroneously reported to
authorities that the plaintiffs had abused their daughter.364 The plaintiffs
"took their then twenty-eight day old daughter to the Fort Walton Beach
Medical Center emergency room" because of breathing problems that she
365
was experiencing. Pursuant to a CT scan ordered by defendant, "the radi-
ologist who interpreted the scan," Dr. Helmich, indicated that the child had a
skull fracture that was caused by either birth trauma or child abuse.366 The
plaintiffs told the physician that the child had been removed "from the birth
356. 920 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
357. Id. at 667.
358. Id. at 666-67.
359. Id. at 667.
360. Id.
361. Jibory, 920 So. 2d at 667.
362. Id. at 668.
363. 947 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
364. Id. at 540.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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canal with forceps," but she did not think that the fracture was caused by
that.367 She recommended other tests, which were declined by the parents.
The court interpreted the immunity provisions found in the Florida Sta-
tutes regarding child abuse reports. 369 Section 39.203, provides "a general
grant of immunity to a person who makes" a good faith report that a child
has been abused.37 ° Section 39.201, requires "medical doctors and other
health care professionals who have reasonable cause to suspect" abuse or
neglect, to report their suspicions to the appropriate state authorities. 371 The
court read the two provisions together to conclude that the doctor would have
immunity if there was objective evidence of reasonable cause to suspect
abuse.372 Further, it found that even lacking reasonable cause, the doctor
retained immunity from civil liability if the report was made in good faith.373
In this case, the court still held that, as a matter of law, the court could de-
termine reasonable cause existed despite allegations by the plaintiffs that a
subsequent CT scan showed no skull fracture and that the doctor made the
report out of spite because of arguments with the parents.374
The First District considered the provisions of another immunity statute
in Andrew v. Shands at Lake Shore, Inc.37 5 The plaintiffs alleged that their
fifteen year-old son, Dustin, died as a result of a radiologist at Shands Hos-
pital whose unreasonable failure to properly examine a CT scan, which
would have revealed a malignant tumor.376 Shands is engaged in a joint ven-
ture with the University of Florida College of Medicine, acting through the
Board of Trustees, in which all radiologists permitted staff privileges are
employed by the College of Medicine.377 The appellate court held that sec-
tion 768.28(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which immunized the radiologist
from tort liability in this case, does not protect a third party private entity
such as Shands, which is "jointly responsible for the radiologist's con-
duct. 378
The Fourth District considered the qualified immunity of inspectors
from the Department of Agriculture and a sheriffs deputy who arrested the
367. Id. at 540-41.
368. Urquhart, 947 So. 2d at 540-41.
369. See id. at 541.
370. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 39.203 (2008).
371. Urquhart, 947 So. 2d at 541; see FLA. STAT. § 39.201 (2008).
372. Urquhart, 947 So. 2d at 542.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 543.
375. 970 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 889.
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plaintiff in Vaughan v. Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Ser-
vices.379 The inspectors entered Vaughan's property to inspect his citrus
trees without a warrant. 380 After Vaughan refused entry, the inspectors called
the Broward County Sheriffs Office and Deputy Weller appeared and ar-
rested Vaughan.381 The court considered whether section 581.031(15)(a),
Florida Statutes, which gives a general grant of power to inspectors "'to en-
ter into... any place' thought to house or contain anything that could threat-
en agricultural interests" and section 581.184, Florida Statutes, which re-
quires the sheriff to assist and protect department employees in obtaining
such access, immunized the defendants from suit.382 The majority conceded
that the defendants' actions violated the Fourth Amendment, the arrest was
invalid, and that the sheriffs office and state could be required to compen-
sate the plaintiff.383 However, the court held that "reasonable public officials
in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the defen-
dants could have believed [that] the law authorized entry without a war-
rant., 384 The majority believed this, in part, because inspectors at the time
were routinely entering property without warrants.385 Judge Farmer argued
vigorously in dissent that the actions of the defendants violated settled Fourth
Amendment law, and that a general immunity statute did not shield their
actions.386 As he noted, the statutes do not dispense with "the requirement of
a warrant" and there were no exigent circumstances giving the inspectors the
right to claim a good faith belief.
387
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the immunity of a hos-
pital in a false imprisonment case in Montejo v. Martin Memorial Medical
Center (Montejo /). 388 Luis Alberto Jimenez, an undocumented Guatema-
lan, "sustained brain damage and severe physical injuries" in an automobile
accident. 389 He "was transported to Martin Memorial Medical Center [and
then] transferred to a skilled nursing facility. ' 390 Because his injuries ren-
dered him mentally incompetent, Montejo Gaspar Montejo was appointed his
379. 920 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. ld. at 652.
383. Id. at 652-53.
384. Vaughan, 920 So. 2d at 653 (citing Walsingham v. Dockery, 671 So. 2d 166, 172
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 654 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 659.
388. 935 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
389. Id.
390. Id.
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guardian.391 "Jimenez was readmitted to [the hospital] on an emergency ba-
sis" on January 26, 2001.392 He was still in the hospital in November, and
"Montejo filed a guardianship plan," seeking skilled care for the following
twelve months.393 Martin Memorial intervened, seeking "permission to dis-
charge Jimenez" and transport him to Guatemala.394 The circuit court
granted the hospital's request, but "Montejo filed a motion to stay the court's
... order."395 Although the court ordered the hospital to respond to the mo-
tion, the hospital proceeded to transport Jimenez to the airport in an ambul-
ance and then to Guatemala via private plane.396 The district court reversed
the trial court's order because of "insufficient evidence that Jimenez could
receive adequate care in Guatemala [and] because 'the trial court lacked sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to authorize"' Jimenez's deportation. 397
Montejo then filed a lawsuit claiming that Jimenez had been falsely im-
prisoned "in the ambulance and on the airplane. 3 98 The defendant argued
that it was immune because its actions were done pursuant to an order valid
at the time of its actions. 399 The court pondered the question of whether the
action was done without legal authority or color of authority.4°° The court
held that legal authority may be met "by irregular or voidable process, but"
not void process.4 °1 It held that an order that lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion was void.4 °2 The hospital claimed that it was entitled to absolute im-
munity for an act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding, but
the court rejected that these acts were protected by the litigation privilege
because the actions were not during the proceeding or pursuant to "an effort
to prosecute or defend [the] lawsuit. ''4°3 It also rejected the defendant's
claim of qualified immunity as afforded state agents because the hospital was
not acting as a governmental agent executing the order.4°4 While reversing
the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint, the court indicated that it was a
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1267.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 1267-68.
396. Id. at 1268.
397. Id. at 1268 (citing Montejo v. Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., (Montejo 1), 874 So. 2d
654, 658 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
398. Montejo II, 935 So. 2d at 1268.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1268-69.
401. Id. at 1269.
402. Id.
403. Montejo 11, 935 So. 2d at 1270.
404. Id. at 1271.
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question of fact to be resolved at trial as to whether the hospital's "actions
were unwarranted and unreasonable.' 4
5
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered how immunity statutes
applied in a defamation case against a psychologist who reported suspected
sexual abuse to the Department of Children and Families (DCF) in Ross v.
Blank.4°6 The plaintiff's "wife met with Blank, a practicing psychologist...
in connection with [her] divorce. 4 °7 In one session, she brought her older
daughter to discuss a situation in which the daughter had showered with the
plaintiff.40 8 After consulting with a colleague who advised Blank that "there
was sufficient evidence" to report possible child abuse, "Blank made a report
to DCF."409 The plaintiff sued, arguing in part that because Blank waited
from March 19, when she was informed of the alleged showering episode,
until June 10, when she actually reported it, she did not suspect child abuse
had occurred. 410 The plaintiff argued that the report was made to retaliate
against him for banning her "from further involvement with the children."41
Citing Urquhart, the court agreed with the First District that motivation was
irrelevant where a professional with mandatory reporting allegations has a
reasonable basis to suspect abuse." 2 The court held that a reasonable basis
existed.413 In addition to being told of the showering episode, the plaintiff's
wife also told Blank that the plaintiff "kept naked pictures of the daughters
on his desk and in his car.' 414 The court also rejected defamation claims
against Blank for statements that she made to a court-appointed custodial
evaluator and the guardian ad litem involved in the custody dispute that
Blank believed the plaintiff was a pedophile.415 These statements were pro-
tected by the litigation privilege. 6
The Fourth District considered another defamation appeal and the issue
of immunity in Cassell v. India.417 India was a police officer injured while
attempting to arrest a suspect.418 He asked for light duty work, but "contin-
405. Id. at 1272.
406. 958 So. 2d 437,439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
407. Id. at 439.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Ross, 958 So. 2d at 439.
412. Id. at 441 (citing Urquhart v. Helmich, 947 So. 2d 539, 542 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2006)).
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Ross, 958 So. 2d at 441.
417. 964 So. 2d 190, 191 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
418. Id.
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ued to work out using light[] weights," activity approved by his doctor.419
His supervisor, Cassell, believed that his weight training "was inconsistent
with [the] light duty assignment and" reported this to his superior officer and
the city's insurance department, who "placed India under surveillance. 42 °
After observing India lifting weights, the "department [then] contacted the
Florida Department of Insurance (DOI) to request a fraud investigation. 42'
Another officer approached Cassell on three separate occasions to ask about
"rumors that India was.., to be arrested. ' 22 On the third occasion, Cassell
indicated that he was. 23 Cassell also told a PBA representative that India
had not gotten hurt on duty.424 The PBA representative believed "that Cas-
sell was trying to influence him to deny India a disability pension, [so the
representative] complained to Internal Affairs" about Cassell's accusation. 5
The court concluded that it had no difficulty concluding that Cassell's state-
ments to "superior officers and representatives" were absolutely privileged
because he was authorized to report suspected fraud. 426 Cassell was also
privileged to tell the PBA representative that he believed a fraudulent claim
was being considered. 27 The court was more troubled about the statements
to a subordinate, but ultimately held that a statement concerning "a depart-
ment rumor of worker's compensation fraud... [by someone with] personal
knowledge of the circumstances [and in response to an inquiry was] suffi-
cient to bring [it] within the scope of Cassell's duties." 28 It also concluded
that the immunity applied to an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim also brought by India.429
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed the "liability of law en-
forcement officers and their governmental employers in [relation to] the ex-
ecution of an arrest warrant and ... taking [a person] into custody" in Wil-
lingham v. City of Orlando.43° Mr. Willingham's wallet was stolen and soon
thereafter he discovered that his identity had been used unlawfully by Craig
Caldwell when the latter was charged for speeding. 3' Mr. Willingham got
419. Id.
420. Id. at 191-92.
421. Id. at 192.
422. Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 192.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 194.
427. Cassell, 964 So. 2d at 195.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 196.
430. 929 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
431. Id.
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the speeding charge dismissed because of mistaken identity.432 Several years
later, Officer Wayne Costa of the Orlando Police Department arrested Wil-
lingham outside of his residence on an outstanding warrant "for failure to
redeliver a hired vehicle. ' '433 Willingham protested "that his identity had
been stolen and ... offered to get documentation," but Costa chose not to
investigate the mistaken identity assertion. 434 Willingham was confined for
five days, until an investigation of his assertions was completed.435 Willing-
ham sued the officer for false arrest and sued his employer, the City of Or-
lando, and Orange County, which operated the jail where he was taken, for
false imprisonment and false arrest.436 Officer Costa claimed immunity un-
der section 768.28(9)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which immunizes officers
from tort liability or suit for acts within the scope of employment "unless
[the] officer ... acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose., 437 The court
held that summary judgment for the officer is not appropriate if "a reasona-
ble trier of fact could possibly conclude that the conduct was willful and
wanton," and also that probable cause is an affirmative defense in a false
arrest claim.438 The court noted that false imprisonment requires that "the
detention [be] without color of legal authority," unlike malicious prosecution
where "the detention is malicious, but under ... due form[] of law., 4 3 9 The
court held that the officer was immune because he "acted reasonably under
the circumstances in fulfilling the nondiscretionary requirements of his posi-
tion ... even if it was mistakenly issued."440 It also upheld summary judg-
ment for the city and county on the ground that "[t]he responsibility to en-
force the law[] for the [public] good [does not create] a duty to act with care
toward[s] any... individual." 44 1
IX. PRIVACY/DEFAMATION
The First District Court of Appeal reversed a jury verdict in a false light
invasion of privacy case in Gannett Co. v. Anderson."2 The plaintiff in the
case, Joe Anderson, Jr., sued the Pensacola News-Journal and its parent
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Willingham, 929 So. 2d at 46.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 46-47 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a) (2003)).
438. Id. at 48.
439. Id.
440. Willingham, 929 So. 2d at 49.
441. Id. at 50.
442. 947 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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companies for an article that he argued "impl[ied] that he ... murdered his
wife."4 3 He originally filed a claim for libel, but because some of the ar-
ticles were beyond the two-year statute of limitations for libel, he amended
his complaint and argued that the privacy claim was controlled by the four-
year statute for unspecified torts, section 95.11(3)(p), Florida Statutes."4
After noting that the false light tort is not universally accepted and that the
Supreme Court of Florida had not directly recognized it, the court concluded
that the Supreme Court of Florida had tacitly recognized its potential exis-
tence.4 5 The court held that since "the plaintiffs false light claim [was] not
distinguishable from" its libel claim, it was bound by the two-year statute.
4
"
6
It reached this conclusion because this claim was based upon the harm to the
plaintiffs reputation as a result of the alleged false impression raised by the
article.47 It certified, however, that this decision conflicted with a case from
the Second District Court of Appeal.4 8
Can a witness in a medical malpractice case sue defendant doctors who
try to get him disciplined for testimony provided? In Fullerton v. Florida
Medical Ass'n (Fullerton 1),449 the First District Court of Appeal addressed
this issue7. ° Dr. John Fullerton testified "in a medical-malpractice [case]
brought against [Dr.] Jonathan B. Warach, [Dr.] Pravinchandra Zala, and
[Dr.] Joseph 0. Krebs. ' '451 The lawsuit "resulted in a judgment exonerating
them., 452 The defendant doctors sent a letter to the Florida Medical Associa-
tion (FMA) seeking discipline against Fullerton, complaining that Fullerton's
"testimony fell below reasonable professional standards, [and] was made 'for
the sole purpose of propagating a frivolous lawsuit for financial gain,' and
that he. . . 'presented false testimony and false theories.'4 53 Fullerton sued,
alleging several theories, including defamation.454 The defendants argued
that "section 766.101, Florida Statutes (2003), and the federal Health Care
Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (HCQIA), immun-
443. Id.
444. Id. at 2,4.
445. Id. at 6 (citing Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc'd Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678
So. 2d 1239, 1252 (Fla. 1996)).
446. Id. at 7.
447. Gannett Co., 947 So. 2d at 10.
448. Id. at 11 (citing Heekin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 789 So. 2d 355, 357 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001)).
449. 938 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
450. See id. at 589.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Fullerton I1, 938 So. 2d at 589.
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ize[d] the FMA" and individual doctors from these claims.455 The court held
that Florida's peer-review statute was created to "evaluat[e] and improv[e]
the quality of health care" so it refused to extend the immunity provisions to
review testimony given by a doctor.456 The court noted that defamatory
statements in judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged.457 In reviewing
the HCQIA, the court agreed that it also did not immunize the defendants in
this case.458
In University of Miami v. Ruiz, 4 59 the Third District Court of Appeal re-
viewed the right of physicians to claim the protection of the Neurological
Injury Compensation Act (NICA), section 766.316, Florida Statutes.460 The
Ruiz' "pre-registered at Jackson North Maternity Center" for medical care.46 1
Mrs. Ruiz received a pamphlet that indicated that the hospital participated in
Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.462 "The hos-
pital representative did not discuss the brochure" nor did the brochure indi-
cate that any staff physicians were participants in the plan.463 Three weeks
later, Ruiz's "baby was delivered.., and was born with significant and per-
manent brain damage. '4 64 In their malpractice action, the plaintiffs com-
plained that they were not given proper notice of NICA.4 65 The court re-
jected that the defendant physicians were excused from giving notice be-
cause Mrs. Ruiz arrived in an emergency condition.466 The court accepted
the plaintiffs' arguments that the physicians had three weeks after registra-
tion with the hospital to provide notice and that the hospital's notice was
inadequate to provide notice of the physicians' participation.467
The Third District Court of Appeal considered a defamation case
against an employer and its human resources manager in American Airlines,
Inc. v. Geddes.468 The plaintiff became involved in disputes with fellow em-
ployees concerning the placement and use of personal computers brought to
455. Id.
456. Id. at 591.
457. Id. at 592 (citing Fariello v. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2004)).
458. Id.
459. 916 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
460. Id. at 868.
461. Id. at 867
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Ruiz, 916 So. 2d at 867.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 869.
467. Id.
468. 960 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
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work by the employees. 469 One employee reported that the plaintiff "had
threatened to 'cut out his intestines. ' '470 Plaintiff denied the statement, al-
though "he admitted to using other than 'church talk"' to the complainant.47'
Meenan, the human relations supervisor, investigated and talked to various
employees who were identified as witnesses.472 She then gave the plaintiff a
"'first advisory"' which apparently included a suspension.473 The plaintiff
alleged that the "investigation was maliciously motivated because of a prior
suit against his employer. 'A 74 The jury, in a confusing verdict, exonerated
the human relations supervisor, but found American Airlines guilty.475 The
court reversed the verdict because there was no evidence of a defamatory
statement made to a third party.476 All statements made between "execu-
tive/managerial employees are considered to be the corporation talking to
itself," statements made to persons identified as witnesses were a part of the
investigation, and statements made to other employees in the plaintiff's de-
partment who wanted to know why the plaintiff was disciplined were in the
interest of "the disciplinary practices of [the] employer and... the safety and
security of [the] workplace. 4 77
In Charles v. State,4 7 8 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the
defamation claim of a discharged employee.479 Charles, an employee of the
Department of Children and Families (Department), was, pursuant to de-
partmental policy, advised of termination of his employment in the presence
of another employee.48° In this instance, the witness was a Department hu-
man resources employee.48' Charles repeatedly asked why he was being
dismissed and was told it was "because of his 'criminal lifestyle.' Charles
alleged that this statement was" untrue and defamatory.482 The appellate
court ruled that the statement was not actionable where the communication
was invited by the claimant under the invited defamation defense.483
469. Id.
470. Id. at 832.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Geddes, 960 So. 2d at 832 (emphasis added).
474. Id.
475. Id. at 833.
476. Id. at 834.
477. Id.
478. 914 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
479. Id.
480. Id. at 2.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Charles, 914 So. 2d at 3-4.
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When are words that can be viewed differently by different groups con-
sidered defamatory? This issue was one of the ones considered by the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.484 The plaintiff's
stepson, an employee and member of the defendant, Jews for Jesus, Inc.
(Jews for Jesus), provided copy for the latter's newsletter, which was also
posted on the group's website, that implied that the plaintiff had converted
her religious beliefs and had become a member of the organization.485 The
plaintiff sued, claiming: "1) false light invasion of privacy, 2) defamation,
and 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress," in addition to "negligent
training and supervision. ' , 86 The court first considered whether the informa-
tion could be considered defamatory since the members of Jews for Jesus
would have considered the alleged actions to reflect positively about the
plaintiff's character.487 However, the website was viewed by others beside
the members, and in fact, the plaintiff discovered the material by one of her
relatives.488 The court acknowledged that one view of defamation considers
information "defamatory if the plaintiff is prejudiced in the eyes of a sub-
stantial and respectable minority of the community. 489 In fact, this is a posi-
tion expressed by Comment e to section 559 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.490 However, because the Supreme Court of Florida has not adopted
this comment, the court declined to adopt it, and upheld dismissal of the de-
famation claim. 4 9 1 Similarly, because the organization considered the alleged
actions positively, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
could not succeed.492 The court was more troubled by the false light
claim. 493 False light claims permit persons to argue that something "highly
offensive to a reasonable" man could be recognized.494 It noted that depth of
feelings about religion could cause someone to feel aggrieved when falsely
accused of converting religion.495 However, it also recognized that no Flori-
da appellate court had expressly affirmed a judgment on a false light claim,
although tacit acknowledgment existed.496 Therefore, it reversed dismissal
484. 944 So. 2d 460,465-66 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
485. Id. at 462.
486. Id. at 462-63.
487. Id. at 465.
488. Id. at 466.
489. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 465.
490. Id. at 465-66.
491. Id. at 466.
492. Id. at 467.
493. See id. at 468.
494. Rapp, 944 So. 2d at 467.
495. Id. at 468.
496. Id.
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of this count and certified "the following question as being one of great pub-
lic importance: Does Florida recognize the tort of false light invasion of
privacy, and if so, are the elements of the tort set forth in section 652E of
Restatement (Second) of Torts? ' 4 9 7
The Fourth District Court of Appeal decided an invasion of privacy ap-
peal in Straub v. Scarpa.498 The defendant sent a letter to members of her
homeowners association asking them "to provide her with proxy rights to
vote for a slate of' candidates for board positions. 499 The letter asserted that
the "owners would be better represented by" persons who only included ne-
cessary expenditures in the operating budget and that the upcoming budget
"contain[ed] very expensive items... hav[ing] nothing to do with the opera-
tion of [the] community. ' '5°° The court upheld the dismissal of the suit, not-
ing that it was an attempt to stifle political speech, because it did not mention
the defendant by name nor describe him and its content "was not 'highly
offensive to a reasonable person.'
5 0
In Alan v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. ,502 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal addressed a defamation claim by a practicing attorney arrested and
"charged with [being] accessory after the fact to murder, threats or extortion,
tampering with a witness, and solicitation to commit perjury. '50 3 "Alan vi-
sited an alleged eyewitness to the murder," which his client was accused of
committing. 5°4 Alan was acquitted of the two charges that were not dropped
by the State.5°5 The Post used information obtained from the arrest warrant,
probable cause affidavit, and "evidence and testimony presented" at trial.
506
Noting that "[a] newspaper 'has a qualified privilege to report accurate-
ly on information received from government officials,"' the appellate court
agreed with the trial court that "the published statements were fair, accurate
and impartial. 5
07
The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided an appeal of an alleged
slander in Scott v. Busch.50 8 Plaintiff Marie Melton-Treworgy ran a "bed and
497. Id.
498. 967 So. 2d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
499. Id. at 439.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 438-39 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977)).
502. 973 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
503. Id. at 1178.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 1178-79.
507. Alan, 973 So. 2d at 1180.
508. 907 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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breakfast business by renting rooms in her home."5°9 The defendant, "Randy
Bush, and her husband own[ed the] home adjacent to Treworgy."5 ° After
"bad feelings developed between the parties," Bush ran for a seat on the
Flagler Beach City Commission.51 ' During a public meeting, the defendant,
"[w]hile looking directly at the [p]laintiff, . . . angrily stated that a person in
her neighborhood had obtained an illegal permit."5 1 2 The plaintiff alleged
that both persons who had and some who had not attended the meeting ques-
tioned her "about obtaining illegal permits and ... questioned her honesty
and integrity." 5 3 The appellate court disagreed with the trial court that this
"statement was a pure opinion," which is not actionable, because the defen-
dant "did not disclose the factual basis [for] her opinion ... [nor state that] it
was just her opinion., 514
The federal Southern District Court of Florida considered Florida defa-
mation law in a case brought by a professional basketball player against a
newspaper, a newspaper columnist, and the owner of the Phoenix Suns pro-
fessional basketball team in Fortson v. Colangelo.15 Fortson, a professional
basketball player with a history of committing flagrant fouls and a reputation
of being a rough player, sued the defendants concerning statements made
about him following an incident in a game in which he was called for a fla-
grant foul that caused a Suns player to break his wrist, and that earned Fort-
son a $1000 fine and three-game suspension.516 Colangelo made statements
that were broadcast and published in the media, after the game, that referred
to Fortson as a "thug., 517 The columnist, Peter Vecsey, wrote a column that
also referred to Fortson as a "vacant lot[]" and "meaningless mass." 51 8 Vec-
sey also accused Fortson of "mugging" defenseless rivals, "maliciously des-
tabilizing a player in mid-flight," "thugg[ing] out," and "attempted mur-
der., 519 The court refused to find that these statements were defamatory. 50
First, the court explained that pure opinion or rhetorical hyperboles are not
actionable. 521 The court stated that the line between factual statements and
509. Id. at 664.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Scott, 907 So. 2d at 664.
514. Id. at668.
515. 434 F. Supp. 2d 1369,1372-73 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
516. Id. at 1373-75.
517. Id. at 1376.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 1376-77.
520. Fortson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1385.
521. Id. at 1379.
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these kinds of comments is difficult to draw, but one for the court to deter-
mine as a matter of law. 22 The court noted that the test is one that requires
the statement to be considered in its totality and in context.2 3 The court held
that Colangelo's statements about the plaintiff being a thug would not lead
the "reasonable listener of any sports program" or any reasonable reader of a
sports section to infer that Fortson "'was a vicious criminal of [any] sort. '524
Similarly, the court found that the reasonable reader would not have inferred
from Vecsey's statements that Fortson was a criminal. 25 It also noted that
these statements were published in a column that clearly would lead the
reader to believe that at least some of the assertions were matters of opi-
526nion.
X. PREMISES LIABILITY
The duty owed by a landowner towards persons who enter his property
has been an issue long debated in the common law. Historically, the com-
mon law has varied the duty depending upon the status of the entrant and the
condition that injures him. As has been the case in past survey articles,527
Florida courts have considered various aspects of this doctrinal area during
the past three years.12' This includes a Supreme Court of Florida case at-
tempting to clarify one of its precedents.529
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the duty of a landowner in re-
gard to conditions on the land that extend into the public right-of-way so as
to create a foreseeable traffic hazard in Williams v. Davis.530  "Twanda
Green, an employee of Diamond Transportation Services, Inc., was . ..
transporting vehicles in a procession from one rental car location to anoth-
er. '531 Green was killed when the car she was driving "was struck by a dump
truck" while Green was attempting a turn at an intersection. 32 Green's estate
"claimed that foliage on the property" of Williams, which abutted the inter-
section, "obstructed Green's view of other traffic as she approached the in-
522. Id.
523. Id. (quoting From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 57 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1981)).
524. Id. at 1381.
525. Fortson, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1385.
526. Id. at 1381.
527. See Adams, Tort Law I1, supra note 1, at 81.
528. See e.g., Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 2007).
529. See id.
530. Id. at 1052, 1054.
531. Id. at 1055.
532. Id.
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tersection. 5 3  The Court noted that the evidence did not indicate that the
foliage "extended [beyond] the bounds of the property," which was critical
for its holding.534 The Court referenced the holding of Whitt v. Silverman,535
which held that a commercial landowner could be liable for injuries to pede-
strian passers-by for a failure "to provide safe egress to vehicles exiting the
premises. '  However, the Court was unwilling to extend this duty to pri-
vate owners of residential property in regard to foliage that does not extend
beyond the property.537
When is the owner responsible for injuries on property that it has
leased? The Second District Court of Appeal considered this issue in Russ v.
Wollheim.538 Russ was injured "while descending a ladder on the premises of
Dinettes Unlimited, Inc., during his employment with the corporation.
5 39
Dinettes leased the property from the Wollheims.5 ° Mr. Wollheim was
"president and chief executive officer of Dinettes. '54' Although a lessor can
avoid liability for injuries to an invitee, the court held that it could not if the
lease fails to confer complete and exclusive possession and control of the
premises to the lessee.542 The lessor had not done so in this case where the
lease permitted "the lessee to 'alter, add to and improve the [piroperty sub-
ject to [1Iessor's prior written approval.' ' 543
Does a business invitee lose that status by engaging in violent acts to-
ward another customer? The Second District Court of Appeal addressed that
question in Byers v. Radiant Group, L.LC.54 A violent conflict erupted be-
tween the occupants of two vehicles in the parking lot of a convenience store
owned by the defendant. 545 Tragically one person was killed and another
seriously injured when the driver of one of the cars "drove his vehicle direct-
ly into" the other two.5" The injured survivor and estate of the deceased
brought a negligence action against the driver and the owner of the store.547
The trial court concluded that the deceased and the survivor changed their
533. Williams, 974 So. 2d at 1055.
534. Id. at 1055-56.
535. 788 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 2001).
536. Williams, 974 So. 2d at 1058-59 (citing Whitt, 788 So. 2d at 222).
537. Id. at 1063.
538. 915 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 1287.
543. Russ, 915 So. 2d at 1287.
544. 966 So. 2d 506, 507 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
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status from business invitees to uninvited licensees or trespassers by being
instigators of violence.548 The appellate court refused to equate this situation
to those where an invitee changes status "by going to a part of the premises
that was off-limits" or by staying past the expiration of the invitation.5 49 Al-
though the court conceded that "a particular act of violence" could potential-
ly cause someone to forfeit his status, such as committing a robbery on the
premises, it was unwilling, as a matter of law, to say that the acts in this case
rose to that level at the summary judgment stage.55° A concurrence by Judge
Altenbernd clarified that he thought that a jury could ultimately determine
that the status was lost if an invitee "intentionally ... remain[s] on the prop-
erty to engage in a . . . brawl, [instead of] as a matter of self-defense. 551
Altenbernd noted that depending upon which version of the facts that a jury
believed, the deceased may have been committing a felony by beating anoth-
er person and a car with a baseball bat and thus would be precluded from
recovery by "section 768.075(4), which prevents a property owner from be-
ing held liable under a negligence theory to an individual who is injured
while committing or attempting to commit a felony. 552 It was also under
dispute whether the survivor "was [also] committing or attempting to commit
a felony" during the brawl. 3
The Third District Court of Appeal considered the duty owed a tenant in
Smith v. Grove Apartments, L.L. C.5 54 The plaintiff, Franklin L. Smith, "fell
from his step ladder [while] attempting to clear and trim overgrown foliage
above the parking lot" of the apartment complex where he was a tenant.
55
"Smith had repeatedly complained to the landlord . . . [that] tree branches
and vines over the parking lot ... were scratching vehicles, causing power
outages, and hitting motorists in the eyes as they... enter[ed] and exit[ed]
their vehicles. 556  Florida Power and Light trimmed trees that impacted
power lines, but "declined Smith's request to [do further] trim[ming]. '
Smith then decided to engage in self-help by taking it upon himself to do the
trimming of vegetation that he considered necessary to alleviate the remain-
ing problems.558 The landlord argued, and the trial court agreed, that the
548. Id. at 508 (referencing circuit court ruling).
549. Byers, 966 So. 2d at 509.
550. Id. at 510.
551. Id. at 511 (Altenbemd, J., concurring).
552. Id. at512-13.
553. Id. at 513.
554. 976 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
555. Id.
556. Id.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 584.
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landlord was not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries." 9 The appel-
late court recognized that a landlord has a "statutory duty to [keep] common
areas in a safe condition."56 The court held that the plaintiff was clearly
within the class meant to be protected by the statute.56' The court then held
that summary judgment for the defendant had to be reversed because the
issue "of whether the tenant's own actions was an intervening and indepen-
dent cause ... so as to relieve the landlord of any liability" was a factual one
upon which reasonable minds could disagree.562
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the liability of a lan-
dlord in regard to an injury off premises in Ramirez v. M.L. Management
Co.563 A child, who was a tenant in the defendant's apartment complex, was
bitten by another tenant's pit bull "in a park adjacent to the... complex. 564
"The park was advertised by the.., complex as an amenity" to its tenants.565
The complex rules specifically prohibited pit bulls.566 The fact that the pit
bulls were "occasionally . . . loose in the complex" had been reported to the
management, but the owner "had not been asked to leave for violation of the
rules. 5 67 The court held that a jury could find a landlord liable for injuries
beyond its premises if it extends its operations, which could be found here
where the landlord invited its tenants to take advantage of the park as an
568amenity. Further, the landlord had a duty to undertake reasonable precau-
tions to protect its tenants from a vicious dog owned by another tenant of
which it had knowledge.569
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the liability of a lan-
downer in a case to a plaintiff who "aggravated a knee injury while 'shooing
cows' that had wandered onto his property from adjacent property" in Flori-
da Power & Light Co. v. Morris (Morris 1/).570 "The cows were owned by
Jose Ruiz who occupie[d] the F[lorida] P[ower &] L[ight] property under a
written license .... ",57 In a prior appeal of the case, the court had reversed a
559. Smith, 976 So. 2d at 585.
560. Id. at 586 (referencing FLA. STAT. § 83.51(2)(a)(3) (2007)).
561. Id. at 587.
562. Id. at 589.
563. 920 So. 2d 36, 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
564. Id. at 36-37.
565. Id. at 36.
566. Id. at 37.
567. Id.
568. Ramirez, 920 So. 2d at 38.
569. Id. at 39.
570. 944 So. 2d 407, 408 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
571. Id.
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dismissal of the complaint.572 The court noted that a landowner could "be
liable to a third party if ... he retain[ed] a possessory interest in the property
... [or] responsibility for maintenance and inspection" of it.573 As owners of
stock are statutorily liable for damages caused when such stock are willfully,
intentionally, carelessly, or negligently allowed to stray or run at large,574 the
court held that FPL was not liable absent assumption of liability in the li-
cense. 575 The court therefore reversed the judgment against FPL because the
license agreement did "not impose a duty upon [the landowner] to construct,
repair, or maintain the fence. 5 76 In addition, FPL's retention of the "right to
enter the premises" did not constitute control so as to impose a duty.
577
Judge Farmer disagreed in a dissent which argued that the license needed to
shift the duty to maintain the fence to the licensee before FPL could avoid
liability.57 ' He also argued that as a licensee, the plaintiff did not exclusively
occupy the land as a tenant would and thus FPL did retain "plenary rights of
control as [an] owner. 5
79
Is a parking lot bumper an open and obvious dangerous condition? That
depends upon the circumstances according to the Fifth District in Aaron v.
Palatka Mall, L.L.C.58° A shopping mall patron tripped over the bumper and
claimed that the mall did not "maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition" or warn "of the dangerous condition. 581  The court held that
summary judgment was inappropriate where the plaintiff alleged that the
bumpers were "almost the same color as the base of the . . . lot; ... there
were only two bumpers;" it was dark, raining and misty, and the "lot was
poorly lit.
582
572. Morris v. Fla. Power & Light Co. (Morris 1), 753 So. 2d 153, 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
573. Morris 11, 944 So. 2d at 410.
574. FLA. STAT. § 588.15 (2008).
575. Morris II, 944 So. 2d at 413.
576. Id. at413.
577. Id.
578. Id. at 415 (Farmer, J., dissenting).
579. Id.
580. 908 So. 2d 574, 577 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
581. Id. at 576.
582. Id. at 578-79.
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XI. PRODUCT LIABILITY
Some of the district courts have also dealt with a number of product lia-
bility claims in the past three years.583 This has included whether a motor
home can be considered a product for strict liability purposes."84 Courts have
also been asked to clarify the extent of design defect liability doctrine.585 As
was discussed in Section VI, this doctrine has also been at issue in the tobac-
co cases.
586
In Cataldo v. Lazy Days R.V. Center, Inc.,587 the Second District Court
of Appeal considered a matter of first impression in Florida, concerning the
possibility of strict liability doctrine to sellers of "used and reconditioned
motor home[s]. ''588 Approximately nineteen months after purchasing the
motor home, Mr. Cataldo "inadvertently engaged the switch," retracting the
steps to the motor home while turning on the lights for it.589 Cataldo later fell
while stepping from the door, and sustained injuries ultimately causing his
death.590 The appellate court first held that although a motor vehicle can be a
dangerous instrumentality, the injury in this case "arose from its function as a
home," not a motor vehicle.5 91 The court then noted that other district courts
in Florida had refused to extend strict liability to sellers of used products in
592design defect cases. After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, con-
cerning the liability of sellers of used products, the court found that there was
no consensus on extending liability.593 Although the Second District refused
to extend the doctrine in this case, it did certify as a question of great impor-
tance, the following question: "CAN A FLORIDA COURT IMPOSE STRICT
LIABILITY ON THE SELLER OF A USED AND RECONDITIONED
MOTOR VEHICLE THAT IS DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED AND
UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS?,,
5 94
583. See generally Cataldo v. Lazy Days R.V. Ctr. Inc., 920 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); Vincent v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 944 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Kohler
Co. v. Marcotte, 907 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Plaza v. Fischer Dev., Inc., 971
So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Rivera v. Baby Trend, Inc., 914 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
584. Cataldo, 920 So. 2d at 175.
585. Plaza, 971 So. 2d at 919.
586. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
587. 920 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
588. Id. at 175.
589. Id. at 176.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 177.
592. Cataldo, 920 So. 2d at 178.
593. Id. at 179.
594. Id. at 180.
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The Second District also considered a product liability case in Vincent
v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,595 which involved "a patient controlled analgesia (PCA)
pump ... [that] allegedly malfunctioned [during surgery,] delivering an
overdose of morphine . . . that . . . totally and permanently disabled" the
plaintiff. 96 The court rejected the argument of defendants, who designed the
pump, that they could not be held liable for negligent design where "an in-
tervening manufacturer or distributor" existed.597
The Third District Court of Appeal reviewed a products liability case in
Kohler Co. v. Marcotte.98 Kohler manufactured the engine in a lawn mower
that injured Timothy Marcotte whose "hand came [into] contact with the
rotating plastic air intake screen."' 99 "Magic Circle Corporation ... manu-
facturer of the lawn mower," "unilaterally decided not to" cover the screen
with a protective guard.6" The court held that since "[t]he engine was not
'defective in itself ... operated ... as it was designed" and any danger "was
open and obvious .... Kohler had no duty to warn., 601 The court deemed it
Magic Circle's responsibility to determine if a guard was necessary. 6"2
Whether something is a product or not was addressed in Plaza v. Fisher
Development, Inc. ,603 by the Third District Court of Appeal.604 The plaintiff,
"an employee of Pottery Barn, was ... injured when he fell onto a conveyor
system" that delivered products from the storage area to the retail area.60 5
Fisher was the general contractor for construction of the store where the
plaintiff was injured.60 6 The Third District upheld the summary judgment for
Fisher because the conveyor system was "a structural improvement to real
property," and therefore not a product subject to strict liability.6 7
The Fourth District considered the liability of a distributor of baby strol-
lers in Rivera v. Baby Trend, Inc. 60 8 Baby Trend, the distributor and marke-
ter, was granted summary judgment because it did not possess "the stroller at
any point in the chain of distribution. '60 9 The court held that possession was
595. 944 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
596. Id. at 1085.
597. Id. at 1086.
598. 907 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
599. Id. at 597.
600. Id. at 597, 98.
601. Id. at 600.
602. Id. at 601.
603. 971 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
604. Id. at 920.
605. Id. at 919-20.
606, See id. at 920.
607. Id. at 924.
608. 914 So. 2d 1102, 1103 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
609. Id.
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a factor to be considered in a strict liability action, but lack of possession
would not preclude liability. 1 ° Where, as here, the defendant was the seller
and marketer and "had some control over the design," summary judgment
611was deemed inappropriate.
XII. MALPRACTICE
The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed an attorney malpractice claim
in Law Office of David J. Stern, P.A. v. Security National Servicing Corp.
(Stern 11).612 The appellee, Security National, accused Stern of accidentally
dismissing a timely filed mortgage foreclosure action instead of the untimely
filed action that he had filed on the same cause.613 His pursuit of the untime-
ly action was fruitless as it was ultimately rejected at summary judgment.6 4
"[T]he mortgage and note were assigned several times," and Security Na-
tional was assigned both during appeal of the botched foreclosure.615 Stern,
who accidentally dismissed the wrong action, admitted that he had commit-
ted malpractice.616 Stern represented Security National during the first month
or two of the appeal. 617 The trial court judge in the malpractice action en-
tered summary judgment against Security National because it lacked an at-
torney-client relationship with Stern when the malpractice occurred.6 18 The
Fourth District reversed, holding "that 'the malpractice action was trans-
ferred incident to the transfer of the note and [action]. '"'619 Justice Bell,
speaking for the Court, first explained that Security National lacked standing
for the legal malpractice action for acts committed by Stem while
representing a prior holder of the note and mortgage. 620 Further, he argued
that Florida follows the majority rule that legal malpractice claims are not
assignable. 621' This required him to explain that it was different from the case
of Cowan Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. v. Kaplan,622 which permitted assign-
610. Id. at 1104.
611. Id. at 1105.
612. 969 So. 2d 962, 964 (Fla. 2007).
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 965.
617. Stem H, 969 So. 2d at 965.
618. Id.
619. Id. (quoting Sec. Nat'l Servicing Corp. v. Law Office of David J. Stem P.A. (Stem 1),
916 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
620. Id. at 966.
621. Id. at 967.
622. 902 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2005).
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ment where it was expressly assigned and the malpractice involved prepara-
tion of placement memoranda intended to benefit not just the corporation,
but all those relying upon the documents in the case.623 In a concurring opi-
nion, Chief Justice Lewis agreed with the result, but disagreed that Kaplan
was wrongly applied by the district court.624 As he noted, any detrimental
actions taken by an attorney in regard to a foreclosure will clearly flow to
"subsequent holders of the note and mortgage. '625 Justice Pariente dissented,
arguing that this case was similar to Kaplan because both involved "general
assignment[s] in a commercial setting ... [of] a panoply of... rights, duties
and obligations. 626 She also noted that the rule in this case protected a "neg-
ligent attorney at the expense of [a] mortgage holder[], who [was] engaged in
legitimate commercial transactions. 627 Justice Quince wrote a separate dis-
sent, also arguing that the "sale of mortgage loans" does not involve the type
of unique and personal duties that preclude the assignment of malpractice
628actions.
The Supreme Court of Florida resolved a conflict concerning the appli-
cation of the physician financial responsibility law629 in medical malpractice
actions against hospitals where the physician holds staff privileges. 630 Ulti-
mately, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded "that the Legislature did not
intend to impose civil liability on hospitals [that do not] ensure that physi-
cians ... granted staff privileges comply with [statutory] financial responsi-
bility requirements., 631  Lena Horowitz claimed that Dr. Derek V. Jhagroo
negligently "examin[ed] and treat[ed] her right thumb in his office., 63 2 Ulti-
mately, her thumb had to be amputated by Dr. Jhagroo at the Plantation Gen-
eral Hospital.633 After obtaining a final judgment against Dr. Jhagroo, the
plaintiff was unable to collect the judgment because of his "fail[ure] to main-
tain malpractice insurance or otherwise comply with [statutory] financial
responsibility requirements., 634 The Court first acknowledged that it had
"recognized a common law duty on the part of... hospitals.., in granting
623. Stern II, 969 So. 2d at 968.
624. Id. at 971 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
625. Id. at 972.
626. Id. at 972-73 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
627. Id. at 973.
628. Stern 11, 696 So. 2d at 974-75 (Quince, J., dissenting).
629. FLA. STAT. § 458.320 (2006).
630. See Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 959 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2007).
631. Id. at 178.
632. Id.
633. Id.
634. Id.
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staff privileges to physicians. 6 35 However, it noted that this duty had been
to select medically competent physicians.636 It declined to extend the "com-
mon law duty ... to monitor the financial responsibility of physicians" and
further concluded that the text "stat[ing] intent, purpose, and general regula-
tory [intent] of chapter 458" did not support imposing a statutory duty on
hospitals to do SO.
637
The Third District Court of Appeal considered agency and proximate
cause issues in a medical malpractice case in Guadagno v. Lifemark Hospit-
als of Florida, Inc.638 The plaintiff's wife injured her leg in a minibike acci-
dent.639 At the emergency room, "she signed admission documents stating
she understood that the emergency room doctor was an independent contrac-
tor."640 Although the "discharge instructions did not [advise] how to avoid
deep vein thrombosis," the doctor testified that he verbally advised her to
stay mobile."4 In fact, the decedent stayed immobile, "[a] clot.., developed
... dislodged and traveled to her heart, causing sudden death. ' '642 The appel-
late court held that even if the doctor's instructions fell below the standard of
care that alone was not enough to establish that proper instructions would
have prevented the injury.643 It held that proximate cause required that the
plaintiff show that it was more likely than not that the allegedly negligent
instruction caused the injury.6' It also rejected the apparent authority argu-
ment because the principal needs to create the appearance of authority for the
claim to succeed, and the hospital here expressly disavowed that the emer-
gency room doctor was its agent.645 It is the action of the principal, not the
belief "of the person dealing with the purported agent" nor the acts of the
purported agent, that controls.646
The Fourth District Court of Appeal considered the standard to be ap-
plied in a medical malpractice case in Edwards v. Simon.6 7 The plaintiff
visited Dr. Strain seeking treatment for her shoulder, which was injured in a
635. Horowitz, 959 So. 2d at 180.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 181,186-87.
638. 972 So. 2d 214, 218 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
639. Id. at 216.
640. Id. at 217.
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. See Guadagno, 972 So. 2d at 218.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id.
647. 961 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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fall in the shower.64 He advised against surgery.649 "She then went to Dr.
Simon who recommended [and performed] surgery," which did not relieve
the pain.65 Dr. Strain testified that surgery was not necessary, but declined
to testify "whether defendant negligently performed the surgery" or whether
it violated the standard of care.651 The appellate court held this was sufficient
to present a triable issue on the standard of care.652 In dissent, Judge May
argued that she would have treated the testimony differently and it did not
raise an issue of whether the defendant had violated the standard of care.653
The Fourth District Court considered the application of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act654 to a malpractice action in
Nwosu ex rel. Ibrahim v. Adler.655 The plaintiff was vaccinated by her pedia-
trician, who "negligently injected the needle into her buttocks causing [per-
manent] nerve damage to the sciatic nerve. 656 The first complaint was dis-
missed for failure by the plaintiff to follow "administrative procedures in the
Vaccine Act., 657 The court ruled that this harm was not a vaccine related
injury as defined in the act because it was an injury caused by the way that
the vaccine was administered as opposed to the liquid in the vaccine.658
The Fifth District Court of Appeal considered whether a doctor has a
duty to a person about whom he was consulted, but never accepted as a pa-
tient in Jackson v. Morillo.659 Jackson went to St. Cloud Hospital because of
extreme pain in his eye, which had a foreign object enter it the previous
day.660 The emergency room physician consulted Dr. Morillo by tele-
phone.661 "Morillo was listed on a consultation directory available to emer-
gency room physicians. ' 62 Morillo never consulted with the plaintiff and
specifically told the emergency room physician that he was not accepting the
plaintiff as a patient. The district court held that summary judgment was
648. Id. at 973.
649. Id. at 973-74.
650. Id. at 974.
651. Id.
652. Edwards, 961 So. 2d at 975.
653. Id. at 976-77 (May, J., dissenting).
654. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2005).
655. 969 So. 2d 516, 517 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
656. Id.
657. Id.
658. Id. at 518.
659. 976 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
660. Id.
661. Id.
662. Id. at 1127.
663. Id.
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inappropriate as there was a factual question whether he owed a duty of
care.
664
XIII. CRUISE SHIPS
As has been discussed in a previous law review article, the application
of tort law principles to maritime law is one that has caught the attention of
federal courts in Florida. 665 Although generally bound by maritime law, the
cruise industry has not been able to completely avoid liability by registering
666their ships in other countries. As cases in the prior article and the ones
discussed below indicate, American courts will not relieve the industry from
having any duty towards their passengers.
The Southern District Court of Florida reviewed a claim involving a
cruise ship passenger who contracted bacterial enteritis from food ingested
on her cruise in Bird v. Celebrity Cruise Line, Inc. 668 After concluding that
the claim was controlled by admiralty law, the court then addressed the
plaintiff's breach of warranty of merchantability claim. 669 The court refused
to recognize such a claim, particularly in this case, where the contract specif-
ically disclaimed any warranty as to food or drink.670 The court also refused
to recognize a strict liability claim, noting that the Eleventh Circuit and Unit-
ed States Supreme Court had only recognized strict liability in cruise ship
cases in which crew members engaged in wrongful intentional acts.67'
The Southern District granted a summary judgment in another cruise
case in Isbell v. Carnival Corp.672 The plaintiffs cruise was re-routed be-
cause of a hurricane and stopped at Belize, where "the [d]efendant's cruise
director described the 'Cave Tubing and Rain Forest Exploration' excur-
sion. ' ,6 73 "[Plassengers [had been] advised not to travel in Belize without
joining a Carnival approved and supported excursion. 674  Amongst other
allegations, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant told her "that 'any 90-
year old woman' could safely enjoy the excursion. ' '675 "Plaintiff [also] al-
664. Jackson, 976 So. 2d at 1129.
665. Adams, Tort Law I, supra note 278, at 331-32.
666. See id. at 331.
667. See id.
668. 428 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1277 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
669. Id. at 1279.
670. Id. at 1280.
671. Id. at 1281-82.
672. 462 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
673. Id. at 1234.
674. Id.
675. Id.
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lege[d] that she... asked [diefendant's employee who was selling the tickets
to the excursion 'if there were any alligators, snakes, bugs, spiders, anything
she needed to be concerned about."' 67 6 Plaintiff claimed that she was told
"that there was no need for concern." 677 "The excursion consisted of floating
down a river in [a] rain forest, in and out of caves, [in] an inner tube. 678
Plaintiff was "bitten by a snake., 679 The court ruled "that 'a general promise
that the trip will be "safe and reliable" does not constitute a guarantee that no
harm will"' occur.680 The court also ruled that the plaintiff needed to demon-
strate that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the danger-
ous condition, herein, the poisonous snake. 681' Additionally, the court found
that the danger was apparent or obvious.682
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
The Third District Court of Appeal decided a rear-end collision case in
Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Saleme.683 Trooper Lo-
zano left the right shoulder of a highway to pursue a speeding motorcyclist
by crossing from the right hand lane across the center and into the left lane.68
Saleme, who was pursuing the speeding motorcycle over a hill, skidded into
the rear of the patrol car.685 Florida has recognized three different fact pat-
terns that may rebut the presumption that the negligence of the rear driver in
a rear-end collision is the sole proximate cause of the accident. 686 The de-
fendant argued that the fact pattern concerning sudden and unexpected stops
or lane changes applied to this case. 687 The court held that this could not
apply where the motorcyclist had testified that he saw the lane change and
the defendant's other witness did not testify that there was a sudden lane
change.688 It also held that the presumption was not rebutted even if there
had been a sudden lane change because the defendant was accelerating his
676. Id.
677. Isbell, 462 F. Supp. 2d at 1234.
678. Id.
679. Id. at 1234-35.
680. Id. at 1237 (quoting Wilson v. Am. Trans Air, Inc., 874 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir.
1989)).
681. Id.
682. Isbell, 462 F. Supp. 2d. at 1238.
683. 963 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
684. Id. at 970-71.
685. Id. at 971.
686. Id. at 972.
687. See id.
688. Saleme, 963 So. 2d at 973.
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vehicle and was at least one-hundred yards ahead of the nearest vehicle be-
hind him.689 The dissent argued that the majority incorrectly engaged in fact
finding and should have permitted the case to proceed without the presump-
tion because the defendant had submitted conflicting evidence.
69
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed a conversion case in Jo-
seph v. Chanin.691 The plaintiff, "Lena Chanin, lived with Meyer Joseph in
his condominium... until his death" and made contributions to a checking
account in the latter's name only.6 92 The roommates agreed to pool their
joint living expenses and to each contribute $1100 a month into the account
for shared expenses.693 After Joseph's death, the plaintiff "discovered that
[the] average joint expenses had been only $900 per month [and that Joseph]
had taken money from the.., account to pay personal expenses and... fund
a separate savings account."'694 The plaintiff sued Joseph's daughter, Barba-
ra, as beneficiary of the savings account on three different theories.695 The
jury found for the plaintiff on the conversion theory.696 The appellate court
held that the checking account was held in joint tenancy with a right of sur-
vivorship and that a "joint tenant may bring a conversion action against
another joint tenant who wrongfully appropriates more than his share of the
money." 697 As beneficiary of the funds in the savings account, she became
liable by exercising dominion over those funds, knowing of the plaintiff's
claim. 69
8
The Fourth District Court considered the liability of an employer in
Martin v. Gulfstream Metal Plating, Inc.6' The plaintiff was walking her
employer's dog who ran around her "to reach another dog owned by" anoth-
er employee of the company, which was unattended.700 The dogs were be-
having in playful behavior, but the plaintiff's feet became entangled in the
leash, which caused her to fall.70 ' The other dog was regularly brought to
work and left unattended. 72 The court noted that landowners are not liable
689. Id. at 975.
690. Id. at 981 (Cortifias, J., dissenting).
691. 940 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id.
695. Id.
696. Joseph, 940 So. 2d at 485-86.
697. Id. at 486.
698. Id.
699. 977 So. 2d 688, 688 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id.
[Vol. 33
56
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss1/3
REVIEW OF FLORIDA TORT CASE LAW
for injuries off premises involving a dog not owned, maintained, nor con-
trolled by the landowner.70 3 It also re-affirmed that
an employer is not liable for injury caused to a third party by [an]
employee's dog if ... bringing ... the dog to [the] work site: 1)
"is not consented to or encouraged by the employer," 2) is "of no
benefit to the employer," 3) is "not within the scope of the em-
ployee's duties," and 4) "the employer has no knowledge of the vi-
cious propensities of the animal. ' 7 4
The Fourth District Court found that the Underground Facility Damage
Prevention and Safety Act (UFDPSA) 7 5 exculpated a utility company and
locating contractor for failure to mark underground utilities prior to excava-
tion work. 706 "[T]he City of Margate [called] in a locate request to One-
Call," a statutorily-created corporation that "serves as the interface between
excavators and underground facility operators" so that the former can give
notice to all utilities of intent to excavate for work to be performed; but, the
address given was inaccurate, and the work did not commence within the
time period designated. 70 7 The plaintiff was injured from an electrical shock
sustained at the excavation site.708 The court held that the statutory scheme
exculpated the utility and its locating contractor and also "supersede[d] any
common law on the" subject.7°
The Fourth District Court of Appeal resolved a lawsuit between law
firms in a tortious interference with contract claim in Kreizinger v. Schlesin-
ger.71 °
Patricia Gates [retained] Loreen Kreizinger to represent her and
her daughter in a medical malpractice action. After five years of..
. representation .... on the eve of docket call for ... trial....
Gates contacted Scott Schlesinger and the Sheldon J. Schlesinger,
P.A., law firm. Gates made Schlesinger aware of Kreizinger's re-
703. Id. at 689.
704. Martin, 977 So. 2d at 691 (quoting Roberts v. 219 S. Atl. Blvd., Inc., 914 So. 2d
1108, 1109 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
705. FLA. STAT. § 556.101 (1997).
706. Martin v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 909 So. 2d 555, 556 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(per curiam).
707. Id. at 555-57.
708. Id. at 556.
709. Id. at 558 (citing Hardick v. Homol, 795 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
710. 925 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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presentation .... The next day Schlesinger arranged and paid for
Gates to fly to Fort Lauderdale from ... Pensacola.
71 1
Gates terminated employment with Kreizinger and retained Schlesin-
ger.712 Kreizinger argued that the "purchase of the plane ticket constituted an
act of intentional and unjustified interference." '713 Because "[t]he lawyer-
client relationship is an 'at will' contract" and Gates sought out Schlesinger,
the court held that "no intentional and unjustified interference is present.' '74
The Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected a third-party claim by the
owner and driver of an automobile involved in an accident in Huet v. Mike
Shad Ford, Inc. 715 The defendant Huets claimed that the accident was caused
by the negligent repair by Mike Shad Ford.716 The court ruled that indemni-
fication and contribution from subsequent tortfeasors was not recognized.7 17
Instead, the remedy for the Huets was to file an "equitable subrogation
[claim] against Mike Shad Ford. 7 18
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Florida law concerning
false imprisonment in Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc. 7 9 John-
son was accused by a store clerk of inappropriately touching her while he
was shopping in the defendant's store.720 Two store managers and a security
guard escorted him to an office, "where he was detained for one to two
hours., 721 The court ruled that if the employees' allegations were true, John-
son would have been guilty of breach of the peace, a misdemeanor.722 How-
ever, the court also held that it was unlawful for persons who had not wit-
nessed the misdemeanor to detain him.
723
XV. CONCLUSION
As the preceding discussion indicates, Florida courts continued to clari-
fy doctrine in a number of areas. The Supreme Court of Florida has sought
711. Id.
712. Id.
713. Id.
714. Id. at433.
715. 915 So. 2d 723, 724 (Ha. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
716. Id. at 725.
717. Id. at 726.
718. Id. at 726-27.
719. 437 F.3d 1112, 1114 (1lth Cir. 2006).
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id. at 1117.
723. Id.
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to provide more guidance on the application of the impact rule. Based upon
the split of opinions and the attempts by courts to subsequently apply their
decisions, more guidance appears to be necessary in the future. In addition,
Florida courts continue to struggle with the disposition of the individual
claims in the massive class action filed against tobacco companies. More
appeals will most likely occur requiring more clarification of the many issues
involved in this litigation. It is likely that more clarification will also be ne-
cessary to determine when parents can sign binding releases for their minor
children. Otherwise, it is likely that courts will continue to determine the
scope of the duty and proximate cause elements.
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